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INTRODUCTION 
Section 506(a) 1 provides the rule for undersecured creditors. They 
must be given two claims: one fully secured and one fully unsecured. This 
division requires the court to value the collateral in order to determine the 
amount of each of the two claims.1 Simple this may seem, but beneath the
easy dualism of the Bankruptcy Code' are turbulent contradictions that 
have yet to be fully digested in bankruptcy theory. 
The basic issue to be addressed in this article is whether bankruptcy 
valuations are final, or whether bankruptcy courts may change them as 
the circumstances require. If a Section 506(a) valuation is final and irre­
versible (as some doctrines take it to be), then the trustee has a powerful 
incentive to denigrate the value of the collateral at a Section 506(a) valua­
tion hearing and turn around and sell the same collateral at a high price, 
so that the profit that would have gone to the secured party may be kept 
by the trustee for the general creditors. Such a practice constitutes the 
creation of debtor equity where none existed before, and it amounts to an 
arbitrage between the bankruptcy court's low valuation and the higher 
price a buyer pays at a later sale. 
Against this abusive potential in the Code stands several protective 
devices. These safeguards have the ironic quality of implying that the 
danger identified above is a reality. That is, safeguards against bank­
ruptcy valuations imply that valuations are final. One such safeguard 
' 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985) 
• Because collateral value changes over time, the point at which the valuation is undertaken is 
important. For a very good essay on this question, sec Note, Bankruptcy Code§ 506(a) and Under­
securtd Creditors: What Datt for Valuation?, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1953 ( 1987) [hereinafter UCLA 
Note]. The author reports that when the value of collateral appreciates after the bankruptcy petition 
is filed, courts have unanimously chosen the date of the petition as relevant. Id. at 1956 (citing In re 
Rappaport, 19 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. I 982); In re Pitre, 11 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1981); In re Tanner, 14 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981). But when the value of collateral has 
declined, the author has identified three different positions that courts actually take: (I) the petition 
date, e.g., In rt Brager, 39 Bankr. 441, 443 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984), ajfd sub nom. Brager v. Blum, 
49 Bankr. 626 (E.D. Pa. 1985); (2) the date of the valuation hearing, t.g .. In rt Stafford, 24 Bankr. 
870, 872 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); and (3) the date a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed. In re Cook, 38 
Bankr. 870, 872 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984}. Su UCLA Note, supra, at 1968-71. 
1 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 
101-1330), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. o. 
98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Bank­
ruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
554, 100 Stat. 3114 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); and, 
Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stal. 610 (codified as 
amended in various sections of I 1 U.S.C.) [The 1978 Act, as amended to date, will hereinafter be 
referred to as the "Code".]. 
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holds that a secured party who objects to a low judicial valuation may bid 
in her claim at the auction.• That is, instead of competing in the auction 
with cash, like everybody else, the undersecured party may bid in her 
claim as an offset.a Later, the secured party can proceed to resell the col­
lateral at a profit for its "true" value. If the bid-in sale provision worked 
smoothly, the undersecured party would be protected against low valua­
tions by the bankruptcy court. Unfortunately, there are numerous flaws 
and contradictions in the governing provision. These will be set forth be­
low, and a sensible reading of the statute will be suggested to avoid these 
problems. 
A second safeguard against incorrect valuations of collateral is the 
infamous Section 1111 (b)6 election, a power of undersecured creditors that 
exists only in Chapter 11 proceedings. Section 1111 (b) provides that if an 
undersecured party makes such an election, "then notwithstanding Section 
506(a) of this title, such claim is a secured claim to the extent that such 
claim is allowed."' This opaque language is usually read to mean that if 
an undersecured creditor qualifies to make the election, she may insist 
that the Chapter 11 plan pay the undersecured creditor 100 percent of the 
face amount of the claim. This is the orthodox reading of Section 1111 (b), 
and one this article will argue against. 
A numerical example will explain the consequences of the orthodox 
reading. Suppose A has lent S 1,000,000 to the debtor. The collateral is 
worth $100,000. There are no liens other than A's on the collateral. 
Therefore, A's secured claim has a Section 506(a) ceiling of $100,000. 
That is, A is deemed to have a totally secured claim of $100,000 and an 
unsecured claim of $900,000. If the undersecured creditor makes the Sec­
tion 1111 (b) election, the undersecured creditor must receive $1,000,000 
under the Chapter 11 plan, thereby gaining a preference of $900,000 over 
other general creditors. This remarkable effect is more than tempered by 
the suggestion that the Chapter 11 plan can provide that the S 1,000,000 
in payments be paid over time, and that the present value of the payments 
might be as low as the collateral value-$100,000.8 For example, if we 
' 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
• For example, if A has a secured claim of $10,000 against collateral, and if A is the high bidder 
at an auction at which A bids SI0,000, A need not pay the SI0,000 purchase price in cash. Instead, A 
may satisfy her obligation to pay the purchase price by offsetting, or "bidding in," her SI0,000 claim 
against the debtor. 
• 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (b)(2) (I 982).
' Id. (emphasis added). 
• The suggestion appears in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(B) (1988), which provides: 
(7) With respect 10 each impaired class of claims ... 
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assume a single balloon payment of principle at the end of a fixed period 
and continuously compounding interest at a 10% rate, the debtor-in-pos­
session could def er paying S 1,000,000 for twenty-three years. Such a de­
lay would reduce the St ,000,000 total claim to a present value of 
$100,000.• Thus, what the Section 1111 (b) election giveth (a $900,000 
preference), arithmetical manipulation (an extremely long payout) taketh 
away. 
It will be my purpose to argue against such a sterile reading. Putting 
my theory of the Section 1111 (b) election together with my views on 
bankruptcy valuations, I will argue that until a Chapter 11 plan is 
adopted, a bankruptcy court is free to adjust the Section 506(a) valuation 
to correct any "mistakes." Only the Chapter 11 plan itself may set a firm 
limitation on collateral value. Meanwhile, the purpose of the Section 
111 l(b) election is to repeal the Section 506(a) ceiling on collateral as it 
exists in a -Chapter 11 plan. An electing secured party would then be 
entitled to any appreciation in value that occurs in the collateral, even 
after the plan is confirmed. In the above example, the undersecured credi­
tor will initially be allocated $100,000. Before the Chapter 11 plan is 
confirmed, this amount may be adjusted, consistent with the secured 
party's right to adequate protection. The Chapter 11 plan may freeze the 
secured party at $100,000, but the secured party, if eligible, may elect to 
repeal the strict St 00,000 ceiling on the secured party's entitlements. The 
election entitles the secured party to post-confirmation adjustments and re-
(B) if§ 111 l(b)(2) . _ . applies __ . each holder of a claim ... will receive or retain 
... property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the 
value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in the property that secures 
such claims. (emphasis added). 
• HA = today's desired value of $100,000, V = $1,000,000 in desired future payout, r = 10 % 
imerest compounded continuously, e = 2.71828, "the year-end value to which a principal of II will 
grow if interest at the rate of 100 percem per annum is compounded continuously," CHIANG, FUNDA­
MENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, at 289 (2d ed. 1974), and t = years required 
to match present value and eventual payout (the variable we seek here), then the relation between A 
and V can be expressed as 
A = Ve-rt 
Substituting our numbers: 
Sl,000,000 
$1,000,000 - e.It 
or 
e.lt - 10 
. It = In 10 
.h = 2.3025851 
t = 23 years, 9 days, 3 hours 
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examinations notwithstanding the Section 506(a) valuation. Under this 
reading of the Code, if the collateral value happens to increase, the in­
crease goes to the secured party. 
The article proceeds as follows. Part One of this article discusses the 
rights of an undersecured creditor under Section 506(a), which requires a 
bankruptcy court to divide the undersecured creditor's claim into its se­
cured and unsecured parts. In particular, I will examine whether a court 
might change its mind after an initial Section 506(a) valuation and award 
a secured party more (or less) at a later time. This ends up being a very 
unsettled question. This issue will also entangle us in _other sections of the 
Code that relate to undersecured parties-Section 506(d) (relating to dis­
charge of the unsecured portion of an undersecured claim) and Section 
363(k) (which pertains to the right of undersecured parties to bid in their 
claims at trustee-run auctions). Each of these sections is so confusing that 
painful digressions as to their meaning will be required. 
In Part Two, I discuss the Section 1111 (b) election. As a preliminary 
matter, I will present an extraordinary effect that Chapter 11 has on non­
recourse lenders. 10 Under Section 111 t(b)(l)(A), many undersecured non-
10 By "non-recourse," I mean that the secured party has the right to foreclose on the collateral
but docs not have the right to sue the debtor personally for the underlying debt. The Second Circuit 
has described non-recourse lending as follows: 
A non-recourse clause normally is intended to reduce the risks to the party granting the 
security interest if the secured party is later forced to foreclose on the security. By preclud­
ing the secured party from getting a deficiency judgment against him, the debtor contains 
the risk of loss to the security alone .. . 
Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 735 F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir.), urt. denied, 465 
U.S. 1087 (1984} (citation omitted). 
The definitional machinery for undersecured creditors in the Code is cumbersome. "Claim" is 
defined as "right to payment ... secured or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(4}(A) (1988). Non-recourse 
lenders more or less have a claim under this definition. They have the right 10 sell the collateral to 
generate cash proceeds and then the right to the cash proceeds by which the non-recourse lender is 
paid. This seems dose enough to a "right to payment," even though, in fact, the debtor herself has no 
correlative duty to pay. If non-recourse lenders have "claims," then it follows that they are "credi­
tors." A "creditor11 is 
(A) an entity th�t has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time or before the order
for relief concerning the debtor; [or] 
(B) an entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in § 348(d), 502(f),
502(g}, 502(h), or 502(i) .... 
11 U.S.C. § 101(9). Non-recourse lenders have a claim against property of the estate, but these claims 
are not described in 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), or 11 U.S.C. § 502(f)(i) (1982 & 
Supp. IV 1986). Therefore, non-recourse lenders are not creditors by virtue of § 101 (9)(B} and can 
only be so by virtue or§ 101(9)(A). Although they would seem not to be creditors under§ 101(9)(A) 
either, 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) (I 982 & Supp. IV I 986) happily provides that a " 'claim against the 
debtor' includes [a] claim against property of the debtor." Therefore, it follows that non-recourse 
lenders are creditors under § I 01 (9)(A). 
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recourse lenders are awarded recourse-an unsecured claim against the 
debtor-in-possession-that would not have existed under state law or even 
in Chapter 7 liquidation. This entitlement, however, is denied any under­
secured creditor who "elects" under Section 111 t(b)(2). Thereafter, I will 
present the orthodox interpretation of the Section 1111 (b) election in or­
der to show that this reading does not yield optimal results as applied in 
real cases. Instead, I will present an alternative reading of the election 
together with a strong doctrinal demonstration of why the alternative 
reading is superior to the orthodox reading. 
I will conclude with some thoughts on some hidden property notions 
that all of the above bankruptcy provisions imply. Specifically, the prop­
erty issue is: who owns the benefit of increasing value of the collateral in 
light of the fact that a competent valuation already accounts for the odds 
that the increase in value will or will not materialize? 
I. 506(a) VALUATIONS
Secured and unsecured creditors each receive radically different treat­
ment under the Code. Secured creditors are entitled to full value of their 
claims.11 At least to the extent of their equity cushion, secured parties are 
Nothing in the Code explains the extent to which a non-recourse lender has a claim. Is it to the 
amount or the advances and incidentals made: by the non-recourse lender to the debtor, or is there a 
ceiling set by collateral value? Obviously, the whole idea or no recourse suggests that collateral value 
constitutes a ceiling. The fact that § 111 l(b)(I )(A) changes non-electing non-recourse lenders into 
recourse lenders suggests that the recourse claim under § 502 is limited by the value or the collateral. 
One author reaches th.is conclusion by taking § S02(b)(I) (bankruptcy court required to disallow 
claim that "is unenforceable against the debtor and property or the debtor .... ") and adding a § 
506(a) valuation that splits an undersecured claim into its secured and unsecured parts. The idea 
seems to be that the entire non-recourse claim is initially allowed, with no limits, but tha1 1hc division 
in § 506(a) disallows a portion or the non-recourse claim, because 1he deficit is not enforceable against 
the debtor or his property. See Stein, Section 111 J(b): Providing Undtrstcurtd Crtditors with Post­
confirmation Appreciation in the Value of Collateral, 56 AM. BAN KR. L.J. 195, 204-05 (I 982). Such 
a view docs not really help us read § I l t 1(b)(2), which requires us to know to what extenl the 
secured claim is allowed, notwithstanding § 506(a). This idea also contradicts the automatic naturt 
or § 506(d), an avoidance provision that is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 40-42. 
A bill passed by the Senate would have made clearer th.at once the § 506(a) hearing occurred, the 
non-recourse claim became limited to the value or the collateral, with the unsecured portion being 
disallowed. Unfortunately, the bill died in the House or Representatives. S. 863, 97th Cong., ts1 Sess. 
§ 33(a) (1981). Stt Stein, supra, at 205 n.39. As a result, definitional exegesis presented in this
footnote has been long and tor1ured. 
These observations may prove nothing more than the fact that even skilled draftspersons face 
enormous difficulties in crafting adequate definitions. Let us therefore ignore the definitions and sim­
ply assume that the non-recourse lender is a creditor whose claim is limited 10 the maximum amount 
or collateral value. 
11 11 U.S.C. § 725 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988). 
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entitled to post-petition interest. 11 They need not be paid immediately and 
their repossessory powers are stayed. 18 Nevertheless, they are entitled to 
adequate protection of their interests to assure that, over time, the collat­
eral does not decrease in value. 14 This is, at least, the theory, and perhaps 
the practice, of the Code. 
Meanwhile, unsecured creditors receive no post-bankruptcy interest111 
( unless, by some miracle, there is a surplus after all the principal amounts 
of creditor claims are paid). 16 Furthermore, as time goes by, the bankrupt 
estate can be (and usually is) eaten away by expensive administrative 
costs, from which secured creditors are largely exempt. 17 For these rea­
sons, secured creditors are treated much better in bankruptcy than are 
unsecured creditors. 
So strong is the bicameral instinct to divide all creditors into either 
secured or unsecured categories that the Code forces undersecured credi­
tors to divide their claims into two parts: one fully secured and one fully 
unsecured. 18 The fully secured part is entitled to adequate protection of its 
value and the fully unsecured part is entitled to none. How seriously do 
we take this split of the undersecured creditor's claim into an in personam 
claim and a non-recourse in rem claim against the collateral? Can it be 
corrected later when it appears the valuation was too conservative, or does 
the Section 506(a) valuation create a ceiling that can be overcome only by 
one of the express protections that the Code provides undersecured 
creditors? 
This ends up being a very important question in assessing how nu­
merous bankruptcy provisions interact with each other. Surprisingly, there 
is remarkably little authority on either point. Here is some legislative 
history: 
11 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). There are many hidden controversies with 
regard to this statement which are covered in Carlson, Postpetition Interest Undtr Tht Banltruptcy 
Codt, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 636-53 (1989). 
•• 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
" 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
u 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(S) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988). Even then, 
creditors are entitled only 10 the usually mediocre "legal" rate of interest instead of the higher contract 
rate. 
17 ln rt By-Rite Oil Co., 87 Bankr. 905, 919-21 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988). If the administra­
tive expense relates to preserving the value of, or to selling, the collateral, the bankruptcy trustee may 
charge the administrative expense to the collateral. ti U.S.C. § 506(c) (I 982 & Supp. III I 985). 
•• Hanson v. First Bank of South Dakota, 828 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1987) (the unsecured portion 
of undersecured creditors' claims may be classified with unsecured creditors because they are "sub­
stantially similar"). 
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While courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, the sub­
section makes clear that valuation is to be determined in light of the pur­
pose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the subject 
property. To illustrate, a valuation early in the case in a proceeding under 
(S)ections 361-363 would not be binding upon the debtor or creditor at the
time of confirmation of the plan.18 
In this passage, the authors of the legislative history state flatly that 
second looks under Section 506(a) must be allowed, but a careful reading 
of this passage reveals that they did not mean to say that Section 506(a) 
valuations could not constitute a ceiling on undersecured creditor entitle­
ments to collateral. Rather, they imply that the ceiling has to be part of 
the Chapter 11 plan. Therefore, it appears that flexibility exists up until 
such time as a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed. By implication, in Chapter 7 
liquidations, Section 506(a) valuations might never constitute ceilings on 
undersecured creditor entitlements.20 
A. Sales Free and Clear of Liens
The sincerity of the Section 506(a) valuation as a fixed ceiling can be
tested in interpreting Section 363(f)(3). Under this section, the trustee 
may sell free and clear of liens, but only if "the price at which such prop­
erty is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such 
property."21 Suppose A (who is senior) and B (who is junior) are secured 
11 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Coot: CoNG. & AoMIN. 
NEWS 5787, 5854 (emphasis added). See In re Richardson, 97 Bankr. 161, 162 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) ("A 
valuation made for one purpose is not res judicata as to a later valuation in the same case for a 
different purpose."); In re Terrace Gardens Park Partnership, 96 Bankr. 707, 710 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tex. I 989) ("But it is sheer arrogance for any bankruptcy court to maintain that it can, in the space 
of a few hours of hearing testimony, actually stt values with binding collateral estoppel or res judicata 
effect.") 
•• 
IT]his valuation is to be used only for purposes of determining what constitutes adequate 
protection for the Bank under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code .... Additionally, a 
determination of what portion of an allowed claim is secured arid what portion is not, is 
binding only for the purpose for which the determination is made. Thus, determinations 
for purposes of adequate protection are not binding for the purposes of "cram down" on 
confirmation in a case under Chapter 11. 
In re Datair Systems Corp., 42 Bankr. 241, 243-44 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (citations omitted); ac­
cord In re Valley Park Group, Inc., 96 Bankr. 16, 24 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989). 
11 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (1982 & Supp. JV 1986) (emphasis added). There are oth_er provisions 
in § 363(f)(3) that might provide for a sale free and clear of liens. Subsection (1), for example, 
provides that the trustee may sell, free and clear of any property interest, if "applicable nonban­
kruptcy law permits lit]." This allows a bankruptcy trustee to sell inventory free and clear of security 
1 989 ]  Second Looks at judicial Valuations 26 1 
creditors who each claim $350.  Each claims a lien on the same piece of 
collateral . How high must the bid be before the trustee can sell the collat­
eral free and clear of liens?  The preferred reading is that the trustee may 
not sel l  for anything less than $700. n Such a read ing of Section 363(f) 
suggests that when the debtor has equity that would benefit general credi­
tors , the trustee should seize jurisdiction over the sale and run it herself. 
Common wisdom has it  that leaving the secured parties to sel l  is an infer­
ior result ,  because secured parties have the incentive to obtain only enough 
of a bid to cover their own particular claims. Any work thereafter is done 
for the benefit  of the debtor, which secured parties may not be will ing to 
do. Meanwhile , if  the value of the collateral is below the face amount of 
the secured creditor's claim, the trustee should abandon the collateral to 
the secured part ies;H the trustee works for the general creditors , and such 
a low price implies that the general creditors can get no benefit from the 
trustee's efforts .  u 
interests ( in the ord inary course or business) because state law allows the debtor to do so. U .C .C .  § 9-
307 ( 1 )  ( 1 987 ) .  Subsect ion ( 5 )  might a lso provide for a sale free and dear or l iens. Subsection (5) 
provides for a "free and clear" sale whenever "such entity could be compel led, in a legal or equitable 
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction or such interest ." Because securi t y  interests secure debt 
obligations, it does not seem d i fficu l t  to argue that secured parties can be forced to accept cash in  
satisfaction or a securi ty interest .  One  case has l imited the  use of § 363(1)(5 )  to  cases in which the lien 
creditors have received 100 cents on the dol lar i n  l ieu of foreclosure. Richardson v. Pi tt Coumy (/n rt 
Stroud Wholesale, Inc. ) ,  47 Bankr. 999 (Bankr. E .D.N.C.  1 985 ) .  
The  strategy about to  be suggested 10  enrich bankrupt estates would work under any  provision 
allow ing a sale or col lateral free and dear of liens, except for § 363(1)(5 )  as read by the Stroud 
Wholesale court .  
st Stroud Wholtsalt, 47 Bankr. at 1 001 -02. Stt also H.R .  REP. No. 595 ,  95th Cong. ,  1 st Sess. 
345, rtprin ttd in 1 978  U .S .  CooE CONG. & AOMIN. NEWS 5787, 6301  ("The trustee may sell free 
and clear ir . . .  the sale price of the property is greater than the amount secured by the l ien .") .  
u Louisvil le Join t  Stock Land Bank v. Radford , 295 U.S .  555 ,  584 ( 1 935)  ("By the settled 
practice, a sa le free or liens wil l  not be ordered by the bankruptcy court if it appears that the amount 
of the encumbrance exceeds the value of the property.") (footnote omi tted) ;  In re Terrace Gardens 
Park Partnership ,  96 Bankr. 707, 7 1 2  (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1 989); Noland v. Wi l l iamson (In rt Wil­
liamson), 94 Bankr. 958, 962-63 (Bankr. S. D .  Ohio 1 988) .  
" '  To this I would add one exception. H a  secured party has l iens on two pieces of col l a teral, but  
no one piece of collateral i s  enough to satisfy the claim in ful l ,  it should be possible for the t rustee to 
sell the collateral even though it is not necessary for a reorganization , or if there is no debtor equity. 
For example, suppose a secured party has a total claim of $750 and two pieces of collatera l worth  
$400 apiece. Taken together, the debtor has S50 of equity. The trustee should be able to sdl the 
col l ateral seriatim to reach the equity. Stt 2 CotUER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 363.07 ( 1 5 th ed . I 989). 
Unfortunatel y ,  § 363(£) (3)  is not flexible enough to provide for this and the preferred ru le for 
single pieces or col latera l-that the trustee should sel l only if there is debtor equi ty or need wi th  
regard to a reorganization . I r  a sale is no t  permi tted, then the trustee wi l l  have to seek a valuation 
from the bankruptcy court, followed by an abandonment or one or the items of col lateral .  On the other 
hand, perhaps the col lateral could be abandoned ,  the state law foreclosure sale held, and a post hoc 
deduction made in the secured party's remaining bankruptcy claim. But see In re Caraway , 95 Bankr. 
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Unfortunately, some courts have viciously insisted on reading the 
words of the statute literally. In re Beker Industries, Corp. 211 interprets
Section 363(f)(3) as follows: If A and B each have claims with a face 
amount of $350, but the value of the collateral is $500, then the value of 
the two liens together must also be only $500. That is, the value of the 
two liens can never exceed the value of the collateral. Therefore, the trus­
tee can hold a sale free and clear of liens18 if some buyer bids more than 
SS00.27 
This interpretation presupposes the view that undersecured creditors 
are frozen at their original Section 506(a) valuations. If undersecured 
creditors could simply take cash proceeds up to the face amount of their 
secured claims, regardless of the Section 506(a) ceiling set by a bank­
ruptcy court, then the trustee could never benefit from the Beker interpre­
tation of Section 363(f)(3). Unless secured creditors are frozen at the Sec­
tion 506(a) valuations, a trustee would never have an incentive to 
administer a sale that did not attract a bid over $700.18 
Suppose, in accordance with Beker, that Section 506(a) does consti­
tute a strict ceiling of entitlements. Then, as one commentator has pointed 
out,19 the trustee might have an even more sinister incentive with regard 
to a Section 363(f)(3) sale. By badmouthing the quality of the collateral in 
a Section 506(a) valuation, the trustee could have a bankruptcy court split 
the junior creditor's $350 claim into two parts. For example, assume the 
trustee persuades a bankruptcy court that the collateral can be sold for no 
more than $450, so that A is secured for the full $350 and B (the junior 
creditor) is secured for $100 and unsecured for $250. Such a representa-
466 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1988) (disapproving of such a post lwc deduction and insisting on a present 
valuation of the collateral before abandonment). 
Another exception might be the genuine consent of the secured parties. In re MMS Builders, 
Inc., 101 Bankr. 426 (D.N.J. 1989). Still, the general creditors could complain if they arc paying a 
trustee to work for a secured party. In MMS Builders, however, the trustee was totally compensated 
by the secured party. Id. at 431-32 . 
.. 63 Bankr. 474 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
•• In a later opinion, the Belur court denied permission for a § 363(f)(3) sale because the court 
felt that the price the trustee had obtained was inadequate and that the collateral would soon appreci­
ate in value. In rt Beker Industries, Corp., 64 Bankr. 900, 910-12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd on 
other grounds, 89 Bankr. 336 (S.O.N.Y. 1988). 
•
1 In rt Terrace Gardens Park Partnership, 96 Bankr. 707, 712-13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); 
In re Rouse, 54 Bankr. 31 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985) . 
.. See Carlson, Successor Liability in Banlcruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of lntertemporal 
Creditor Priorities Crtattd by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and Toxic Wastt Cleanup, 
50 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROSS. 119, 141-42 n.102 (Spring 1987) . 
.. Note, Selling Out Undersecured Creditors: "Value" Under§ 363(/J of tht Banlcruptcy Code, 
8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1254 (1987) [hereinafter Cardow Note]. 
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tion might be plausible. Valuations are merely predictions of the price a 
future auction will bring. 80 Unless the collateral is highly fungible and 
stable in price, valuations are inherently uncertain, and, of course, the 
trustee has the advocate's duty to maximize the position of her unsecured 
clients. In any case, after badmouthing the collateral to the judge, the 
trustee might then turn around and so praise the quality of the collateral 
at an auction that a buyer is willing to bid SS00. This SS00 would go first 
to A (for $350), then to B (for $100, the secured part of her claim), then 
to the trustee for SS0. This last SS0 properly should have gone to the 
junior secured creditor. 81 Through the Beker court's reading of Section 
363(f)(3), the trustee has an incentive to create debtor equity by disparag­
ing the "true" value of collateral to the bankruptcy judge.32 In fact, the 
Beker reading of Section 363(£)(3) is interesting to trustees only if such a 
scheme is undertaken; otherwise, the trustee simply sells on behalf of se­
cured creditors and obtains no benefit for the unsecured creditors, out of 
whose take comes the trustee's commission. 
B. Avoidance Under Section 506(d)
Section 506(d) directly supports the idea that the trustee can profit
•• Id. at 1261. 
11 That is, the junior secured party would have received this extra S50 if there had been no 
bankruptcy and if the sale had been conducted under the auspices of state law. 
u For a case finding such a scheme unconscionable, see In re Krueger, 66 Bankr. 463 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1986). According to Judge Britton:
[T]his debtor's scheme is inequitable. In essence, he forces his mortgagee to estimate the
current value of his security under § 506, then under § 363(f) the debtor proposes to place 
the collateral on the market, dictating the time and terms of sale, in the hope that the
mortgagee has undervalued the security and can, therefore, be compelled to subordinate its
claim to inferior obligations of the debtor. This court cannot permit these statutory provi­
sions to be used by the debtor to take unconscionable advantage of any creditor. I cannot
countenance this scheme and I find that this [Chapter 11 plan] has not been proposed in 
good faith. 
Id. at 465. But another case approves of hypocritical claims of value when the creditor is the hypo­
crite. Creditors who would like to have the automatic stay lifted have an incentive to disparage collat­
eral value. That is, if the creditor has a SIOO claim, the creditor can get the stay lifted if there is no 
need for the collateral and no reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (I 982 & Supp. IV 1986). In such 
a case, the creditor will want to claim that the collateral is worth less than SI 00, but that same 
creditor has opposite incentives in other contexts. For example, the creditor is entitled to post-bank­
ruptcy interest only if the debtor has equity in the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982 & Supp. JII 
1985). When post-bankruptcy interest is at stake, the creditor has an incentive to claim that the 
collateral is worth more than SIOO. Courts have approved this practice of claiming one value or 
another as it suits the creditor's interest. Su, e.g., In re Realty Investments, Ltd. V, 72 Bankr. 143, 
146 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987). If secured creditors can enjoy the fruits of this hypocrisy, why not the 
bankruptcy trustee? 
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by minimizing collateral value under Section 506(a) and by maximizing it 
under Section 363(£)(3). Section 506(d) is usually thought to be a provi­
sion that benefits debtors, but, as we shall see, the trustee can make crea­
tive use of this section as well. 
Section 506(d) mysteriously provides: "To the extent that a lien 
secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, 
such lien is void . . . . "88 This Section allows the trustee to insist that an
underwater lien be divided into two parts; the fully secured and fully un­
secured parts respectively. The first part becomes "an allowed secured 
claim." This part survives Section 506(d) and remains a genuine lien. To 
the extent the lien attempts also to secure the unsecured portion of the 
bifurcated claim, "such lien is void," according to Section 506(d). As a 
result, the trustee can use this provision to place a cap on the amount of 
the underwater liens.84 
Let us review the significance of Section 506(d) by means of illustra­
tion. Suppose collateral is worth $500 in its natural unencumbered state. 
The collateral is encumbered by two security interests, one held by A, 
who is senior and who has lent $350, and one held by B, who is junior 
and who has lent $350. The trustee asks that the bankruptcy court value 
the claims under Section 506(a). In the hearing, the court undervalues the 
collateral at $450. Accordingly, A's claim is deemed to have a fully se­
cured claim for $350. B's claim is divided into two. The secured claim is 
valued at $100; the unsecured claim is deemed to be $250. Under Section 
506(d), B's lien is limited to $100; the lien for the $250 unsecured claim is 
entirely destroyed. 
Because there is no equity in the collateral, the trustee might aban­
don it to the debtor and any surviving secured creditors.311 Once the trustee 
has abandoned the collateral, the automatic stay no longer applies to re­
strain A (whose lien is intact) or B (whose lien has been reduced to $100). 
Suppose A moves to foreclose her security interest and, at the auction, a 
buyer bids $500. Of this, $350 goes to extinguish A's claim, $100 goes to 
B to extinguish her (secured) claim, and $50 goes to the debtor.38 Thus, 
•• 11 U.S.C. § S06(d) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985). 
14 "This Court is of th.e opinion that § 506(d) is intended merely to facilitate the sale of collat­
eral by the trustee or the debtor-in-possession in order to extinguish the entire lien even though the 
sale is at a price insufficient to satisfy the lien in full." In rt Maitland, 61 Bankr. 130, 134 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1986) (citing In rt Mahancr, 34 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
" Su 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Under § 362(d)(2)(B), the trustee 
need not abandon if the collateral is necessary for a successful rehabilitation. The context here, how­
ever, is individual, so that rehabilitation is not a factor. 
" Stt generally Kruger v. Beneficial Commercial Corp. (In rt Kruger), 77 Bankr. 785 (Bankr. 
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the debtor has successfully arbitraged between the low valuation in bank­
ruptcy and the "true" value of the collateral outside bankruptcy. 97 This is
precisely the same scam that I have suggested a trustee might use inside 
bankruptcy, where the trustee can sell free of liens under Section 
363(f)(3 ). 
The existence of this opportunity to arbitrage between low bank­
ruptcy valuations and high real life values was greatly strengthened in the 
1984 amendments to the Code. Before 1984, Section 506(d) read as 
follows: 
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not 
an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless-
( 1) a party in interest has not requested that the court determine and
allow or disallow such claim under section 502 of this title; or 
(2) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(e) of this title.38 
Notice that the lien was not capped at the Section 506(a) amount unless a 
"party in interest" affirmatively requested the cap. 
Today, Section 506(d) reads as follows: 
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not 
an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless-
( 1) such a claim was disallowed under section 502(b)(S) or 502(e) of 
this title; or 
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure 
of an entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.88 
C.D. Cal. 1987) (describing the rules under § 506(d)) . 
., United States v. Garnett, 99 Bankr. 757 (W.D. Ky. 1989); Zlogar v. IRS (In re Zlogar), 101 
Bankr. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. I 989); Tanner v. Financeamerica Consumer Discount Co. (In re Tanner), 
14 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981). The author or an excellent student note usefully reminds us 
that arbitraging off a bad initial valuation is not the only reason collateral values might go up after a 
§ 506(a) valuation. It may also be the case that, after bankruptcy, the property might appreciate
unexpectedly or the debtor might invest in the collateral, or pay down the senior lien. In re Shrum, 98 
Bankr. 995, 1003-04 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (en bane) (Teselle, j., concurring). In these latter 
two eventualities, the debtor's investment would adher-e to the benefit of the undcrsecured creditor
unless § 506(d) voids the unsecured portion of the undersecured creditor's claim. See Note, The 
Debtor's Right to Restrict Lienholder Recovery to the Value of the Encumbered Property Under§ 
506 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 J. CORP. LAW 433, 445-48 (1986) (hereinafter Iowa Note!. Gener­
ally, in any of these cases, the author or the note favors the debtor over the undersecured party on 
''fresh start" policy grounds. Iowa Note, supra, at 445-48 . 
.. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) ( 1982) (emphasis added). Section 502(e) disallows any subrogation claims 
by a surety who has not yet paid off the assured creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 502(e) (1982 & Supp. JV 
1986). This is a provision that is not relevaot to the preseot analysis. 
11 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985). 
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In this revision, no longer does a party have to move for avoidance. Avoid­
ance is automatic, so long as a claim has been filed by (or on behalf of)'0 a 
secured creditor.0 This amendment, by rendering avoidance automatic so 
long as some claim is filed, seems to strengthen the idea that Section 
506(d) implies that undersecured creditors are subject to a strict Section 
506(a) limit.42 
The ability of a debtor to arbitrage between low bankruptcy court 
valuations and real market prices has been confirmed by two court of ap­
peals decisions. In re Folendore0 is a straightforward endorsement of the 
debtor's ability to put a ceiling on the amQunt of the lien. A more compli­
cated endorsement also appears in Lindsey v. Federal Land Bank (In re 
Lindsey)," where the debtor owned real estate overencumbered by two 
liens held by A and B. B, the junior creditor, was undersecured. The 
debtor obtained a Section 506(a) valuation, splitting B's claim into its se­
cured and unsecured parts. The debtor obtained a discharge from the un­
secured claim. The debtor also sought a reformation of the mortgage obli­
gations to A and B, so that the debtor could avoid default by making new 
payments on the suddenly non-recourse secured claims that. A and B held 
against the property of the debtor. The bankruptcy court refused this re­
quest and then ordered the collateral abandoned unless, within thirty 
days, the debtor redeemed the property by paying A and B the total 
amount of their non-recourse claims.0 The debtor did not redeem. In-
•• According to § 501, the trustee or the debtor may file a claim if the secured creditor docs not. 
This gives debtors a powerful tool for wresting from their creditors future unrealized value or just 
plain valuation mistakes. Set 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985). 
41 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) . 
.. One implication of the automaticity of § 506(d) is that it should be possible, even after aban• 
donment or exemption, to ask a bankruptcy coun for a valuation of collateral, because after all, the 
lien is already limited in amount and it is necessary to know what that limit is. This is a feature that 
is ignored in cases where § 506(d) avoidance is disallowed with regard to collateral abandoned before 
the debtor requests a § 506(a) valuation. In re Shrum, 98 Bankr. 995 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (en 
bane); In re Maitland, 61 Bankr. 130, 134 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986). For the view that a court has 
discretion not to value collateral under § 506(a) and hence avoid a lien under § 506(d), see Note, Can 
A Debtor Void A Real Property Lien That Exceeds The Value of The Collaterai': An Interpretation 
Of Section 506(d) Of The Banlcruptcy Code, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1393, 1413·14 (1988). If§ 
506(d) avoidance is now automatic, how�ver, there would seem to be no basis for such a view. 
0 862 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir. 1989) (in dicta, utilizing 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)) . 
.. 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987). 
'" If Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code had applied to this transaction, the debtor could 
have redeemed only by paying A and B the face amounts of their claims. U.C.C. § 9-506 (1987). 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982), D may redeem certain specified personal property by paying the 
amount of the secured claim, which is always less than the face amount of the claim in cases where 
the secured party is under water. 
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stead, the debtor appealed, but without filing a supersedeas bond. Pre­
sumably (although the court does not say so), the foreclosure proceedings 
by A and B went forward under state law, or at least were ready to go 
forward. Exactly what remedy the debtor expected from the Court of Ap­
peals was not made clear, but the debtor seemed to expect that A and B 
would be enjoined from foreclosure.•• 
Whatever the debtor expected, he did not get it. Judge Richard Pos­
ner thought that Section 506(a) could not be used to reform loan agree­
ments. He also made some preliminary remarks suggesting that Section 
506(a) could not be used to manufacture debtor equity through arbitrag­
ing between valuation hearing and auction. 
It would be absurd to think that Chapter 7 could be used, as [the 
debtors] would use it, just to reduce the amount due on a mortgage. Then 
in any period of depressed real estate values, when a farmer's liabilities 
exceeded his assets, he could get the liabilities reduced simply by declaring 
bankruptcy .... The main purpose served by section 506 is to put the 
secured creditor who chooses to pursue his rights in bankruptcy in the same 
position that he would occupy if he had decided to bypass bankruptcy. If 
such a creditor bypassed bankruptcy and foreclosed his lien, he would ob­
tain the market value of the interest secured by the lien and a deficiency 
judgment for the rest. Section 506 gives him a secured interest that he can 
foreclose on equal to the market value of his interest, and makes him an 
unsecured creditor for the rest, which is all that a judgment creditor is any­
way. The statute is not intended to put him in a grossly inferior position to 
what he would occupy outside bankruptcy, by denying him all rights of 
foreclosure after the debtor has defaulted and the lien has been written 
down.47 
•• There is some reason to believe the deb1or substantially overestimated 1he jurisdictional power 
of 1he Court of Appeals to help him out If 1he property had been abandoned, the bankruptcy courl 
would have no furlher jurisdiction over 1he property. See Elsconl, Inc. v. First Wisconsin Fin. Corp. 
(In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127, 131-32 (7th Cir. 1987); In rt Hunter, 76 Bankr. 117 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1987) (1ruslcc could not gel property back once the property was finally abandoned). Nor 
did A or B consent to jurisdiction, because neither filed a claim against the debtor. In re Lindsey, 823
F.2d at 191.
47 In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d at 191 (emphasis in original). There are numerous minor impreci­
sions and errors in this passage. First, Posner stales that, absent bankruptcy, a creditor "would obtain 
the market value of the interest secured by the lien .... " This is either a truism (i.e., whatever the 
secured party gets is the market value), or wrong (in that there are numerous types of markets pro­
ducing numerous values). "Market value" is usually a normative term, suggesting that, if the secured 
creditor does not obtain it from a buyer, she has behaved inappropriately. Under such a meaning, it is 
not clear that the secured creditor will get such a market value. 
Second, whether § 506(a) gives the secured creditor a "market value," as Judge Posner assumes, 
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If read closely this language does not apply to our arbitrage scheme 
at all. This anti-debtor language goes to the power of B to proceed with 
the foreclosure and the presumption of the debtor to suppose he can stop 
it. It has nothing to say about the size of the secured claim B has in 
foreclosing, or about whether the debtor or the trustee can arbitrage be­
tween bankruptcy value and true value. On this subject, Posner suddenly 
turns very pro-debtor and, by implication, pro-trustee. 
What the statute does for the debtor ... is enable him to precipitate the 
foreclosure proceedings, which he might want to do, if real estate prices 
were temporarily depressed, in order to minimize the secured claims and 
thus increase the amount available for the unsecured creditors. This pre­
supposes a case in which the trustee is standing in the debtor's shoes and 
representing the unsecured creditors, rather than a case such as this where 
the debtor is simply trying to shield as much of his property as possible 
from the only creditors who are pursuing him.48 
In this passage, Judge Posner openly espouses a view that the trustee 
can create debtor equity where none would have existed under state law, 
through the use of Section 506(a).49 This opinion, then, does support an 
depends entirely on the predictive skill of the judge. Because no market transaction actually occurs in 
a § 506(a) hearing, the judge is merely hypothesizing what price a future transaction might bring. 
Third, Posner is imprecise in suggesting that judgment creditors are unsecured creditors. Often a 
judgment portends a lien in and of itself, in which case the judgment creditor is a secured creditor 
under state law. E.g., N.Y. Ctv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5203(a) (McKinney 1978) (creating a judgment 
lien on real estate). 
•• In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d at 191. This passage suffers from a slight ambiguity. Posner suggests
that a debtor can precipitate a foreclosure proceeding. Only a secured creditor could do this. What 
Posner meant to say is that a debtor could probably provoke a creditor into exercising her foreclosure 
rights. 
•• Judge Posner engages in dubious economics, which is surprising, because, as a law professor, 
he wrote a famous treatise on Law & Economics. 
Posner writes of the pressure he receives for "a liberal intepretation of the bankruptcy laws." Id. 
at 192. He accuses liberals, however, of myopia: 
There is a strong argument that liberal interpretations of bankruptcy law do not even help 
farmers, or any other class of debtors, in the long run - that the fewer the rights that 
creditors have in bankruptcy the higher interest rates will be, because defaults will be more 
costly to creditors. And interest is paid by debtors. Analysis would be more complicated if 
the issue were not debtor versus secured creditors, but trustee, representing the unsecured 
creditors, versus secured creditors; for then higher interest rates on secured debt might be 
offset by lower interest rates on unsecured debt, leaving debtors' net burdens unchanged. 
But this case pits the debtors themselves against the only creditors in the picture .... 
Id. Posner wants to say that, from the perspective of the debtor, the economic case against anti­
creditor regulation is clear because, in the long run, debtors as a class bear the cost of higher interest 
and obtain no compensating benefit. That is wrong; bankruptcy does produce a correlative benefit -
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anti-creditor view m which cei l ings u nder Section 506(a) are firm and 
unchangeable. 10 
Now if the debtor can use Section 506(d) to arbitrage between low 
bankruptcy valuations and higher prices later, so can the trustee. Section 
506(d) voids part of the undersecured creditor's claim,  and the voided lien 
should be preserved for the debtor's estate. On the strength of this obser­
vation , some courts have ruled that the debtor's use of Section 506(d) is 
i l legitimate:1 1 Preservation of a voided lien for the benefit  of a bankrupt 
the possibility of discharge and hence immunity of post -bankruptcy i ncome from future debt enforce­
ment .  Th i s  possibi l i ty of post-bankruptcy wealth is a benefit against wh ich t he  cost of higher i nterest 
must be weighed . Therefore, the case requires the compl icated comparison between costs and benefits 
and i s  just l ike one invol ving a bankruptcy trustee, which Posner thinks is clearly "more complicated ."  
Id. 
Furthermore, Posner relies heav i ly  on the functionalist fallacy : that every law produces an eco­
nomic reaction in society. There are good economic reasons to suppose that such functionalist assump­
tions are wrong. Lenders usually lend only when the chance of defau l t  is smal l .  Wi th i n  the range of 
possibilities in defaul t ,  the bankruptcy rule Posner imagines is itse lf  a very minor contingency. It costs 
creditors resources to think about such t iny risks; they may fi nd it more convenient to forget about the 
risk altogether and to concentrate instead on debtor cash flow ,  asset base and other factors that will 
make or break the loan .  Carlson,  Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient? ,  9 CARDOZO L. REV. 
643 ,  667-79 ( 1 987) ( taking the view that fraudulent conveyance law has no effect on the price of loans 
for this reason) .  Under this view, the price of credit will not rise if the bankruptcy coun fashions a 
marginal ly pro-debtor rule, because the cost of reassessing the risk outweighs the risk i tself. 
What we have from Judge Posner is a romantic yearning for the per st efficient event in the 
world .  Unhappily, all human activity produces good and bad ,  which means that we are doomed to 
very compl icated cost-benefit empirical inqu i ry whenever we practice welfare economic analysis . 
.. For lower court opin ions upholding the debtor's power to cap an undersecured party's l ien ,  
see Garnett v. Farmers Home Admin. (/n re Garnett) , 88 Bankr. 1 23 ,  1 26 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.  1 988) 
(referring to the scam as the "plain meaning" or § 506(d) ) .  See a lso In re Tanner, 1 4  Bankr. 933 
(Bankr. W. D .  Pa. 1 98 1 ). 
For another case supporting the idea that § 506(a) is a strict limit, see In re Caraway, 95 Bankr. 
466 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.  I 988) . In Caraway, the debtor proposed to abandon part or his ra rm. The 
creditor suggested that the § 506(a) spl i t  await the actual foreclosure sale that would soon follow. The 
court insisted, however ,  on a valuat ion, wh ich strongly suggests that , if the foreclosure sale were to 
produce a different amount, the hypotheti cal valuation would sti l l  hold , and the debtor would be able 
to keep the difference. I n  other words, the court must have had i n  mind a sub rosa § 506(d) avoidance 
or the secured credi tor's l im ,  except that the l ien was not preserved for the benefi t of the estate ; rather 
the debtor would benefit from the ceil ing on the secured creditor's enti t lement . Cf Nolan v. Wil liam­
son (In re Will iamson) ,  94 Bankr . 958, 966 & n . 1 0  (Bankr. S .D .  Ohio 1 988) ( trustee's appraisal not 
a cei l i ng, and because a free and clear sale under § 363(f)(3 )  had al ready occurred , a § 506(a) va lua­
t ion was pointless} . 
01 Gaglia v. First Fed. Savings & Loan (/n re Gaglia), 97 Bankr. 250, 25 1 -52 (W.D. Pa. 1 989); 
In re Larsen , 99 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. D .  Alaska 1 989) (collecting cases); In re Shrum, 98 Bankr. 995 
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1 989) (en bane) ; In re Dewsnup, 87 Bankr.  676 (Bankr. D. Utah 1 988); In re 
Maitland, 6 1  Bankr. 1 30, 1 34 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1 986); In re Cordes, 37 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. C .D.  
Cal. 1 984); ln re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308 (Bankr .  W .D .N .Y. 1 983). 
Mahaner seems to be the lead case. In  Mahaner, an undersecured party moved for relief from 
the automatic stay . The debtor protested , because she wan ted to make a motion under § 506(a) that 
270 BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol . 6 
estate is a standard feature of the trustee's powers. 61 The idea is that if a 
trustee avoids a lien, and there is a second lien creditor out there, avoid­
ance should not provide the second lien creditor with a windfall promo­
tion .113 In order to make sure that only the general creditors benefit from 
lien avoidance by the trustee, Section 5 5 1  of the Bankruptcy Code pre­
serves the l ien for the benefit of the estate, so that it can be asserted on 
behalf of the estate, thereby keeping the second lien creditor in her 
place.11' If this provision is used, then the trustee can obtain a low valua-
the security interests be valued and a motion under § 506(d) that the underwater portion of the lien 
be avoided. Then the debtor wanted to redeem the collateral (the family home) for the amount of the 
§ 506(a) ceiling. The court lifted the stay on three grounds. First , it thought that a redemption statute
al ready existed under 1 1  U .S.C. § 722 ( 1 982) . That provision i s  l imi ted to a narrow range of house­
hold goods and sim i lar exempt personal property. There was no warrant, the court t hought ,  to make
§ 506(d) into another redemption statute for different kinds of property .  But stt In rt Gibbs, 44
Bankr. 475, 478 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1 984) (rejecting this argument and point ing out that § 722 appl ies
only in Chapter 7, whereas § 506(d) applies in any of the Chapters); see also I I U.S.C. § 1 322(b)(2) 
( 1 982 & Supp. III 1 985) (Chapter 1 3  plan may not affect the rights of a mortgagee of the debtor's
residence); In re Harris, 94 Bankr. 832, 835-36 (D.N .J .  1989) (allowing § 506(d) avoidance in
Chapter 13 in spite of § l 322(b)(2)); In rt Bruce, 40 Bankr. 884 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1 984) (same ,
with regard to second mortgages, but indicating that Congress intended § I 322(b)(2) to protect fi rst
mortgagees from such treatment).
econd, the Mahantr court noted that if a § 506(d) mot ion were granted and if a l ien were 
part i a l ly avoided, the lien would be preserved for the benefit of the estate. And if the lien were 
preserved for the benefit of the estate, the debtor could not personally ga in  from a continua t ion of the 
automatic stay; t herefore, the stay should be lifted. Finally, the court thought that use of § 506(d) by 
the debtor might be unconstitutional because it amounts to a taking of a secured party's property 
w i thout compensation. The easy answer to this constitutional chal lenge is that the Code routinely 
destroys l iens, as under the voidable preference or fraudulen t conveyance provisions. I f  there is a 
consti tut ional issue, it involves whether § 506(d) can retrospect ively destroy l iens created before 1 978 . 
See Iowa Note , supra note 37,  at 448-49. 
Nevertheless, if the debtor is also the trustee under Chapter 1 1  or Chapter 1 3 , it is a1 least clear 
that the debtor has power to use § 506(d) to cap the undersecured party's claim to collateral. But see 
1 1  U .S .C .  § 1 322(b)(2) ( 1 982 & Supp. III  1 985) (no modification of real estate mortgages allowed 
where col lateral is the principal residence). What the cited cases are saying is that a debtor-in-posses­
sion may not use this power for self-serving reasons. Rather, the power may only be used to benefit 
genera l creditors. But see In re Shrum, 98 Bankr. 995, 1003 ( Bankr. W.D. Ok la. 1 989) (Tesel le, J . )  
( read ing Bankruptcy Ruic 301 2  as  giving any party in interest the right to  request a § 506(a) 
valuation) .  
For some cases allowing a debtor-in-possesion to use § 506(d) in a self-serving way, bu t also 
complain ing that such a u se is unfair, sec In rt Worrel l, 67 Bankr. 1 6, 20 (Bankr. C .D.  I l l . 1 986); In
rt Lyons, 46 Bankr. 604, 606-07 (Bankr. N.D . I l l .  1 985). 
11 See 1 1  U .S.C. § 551 ( 1982); stt gmerally Chobot , Prtstrving Lims Avoided In Banlt­
ruptcy-Limitations and Applications, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J . 1 49 ( 1 988). 
11 In re Appalachian Energy Indus. ,  Inc . ,  25 Bankr. 5 I 5 (Bankr. M .D. Tenn. I 982) . 
.. For example, suppose that collateral worth $500 (if unencumbered) has two security interests 
on i t-one securing A's loan for 1350 and one securing B's loan for $800. Suppose also that A's l ien is 
a voidable preference. I f  the trustee simply destroyed A's l ien by avoid ing it, then B gets a promot ion, 
and the estate gels nothing. Instead, the trustee preserves the avoided l ien for the benefit of the estate 
1 989 ] Second Looks at Judicial Valuations 27 1 
tion of the col lateral under Section 506(a) ,  use Section 506(d) to avoid the 
underwater portion of any lien, and then enforce the preserved lien 
against the misvalued equity . 
This strategy can be done in one of two ways. First, the trustee could 
abandon the property to surviving secured creditors, let  them foreclose 
under state law, and take any cash surplus over the Section 506(a) cei lings 
established in bankruptcy .&& Second, the trustee could retain jurisdiction of 
and u ses the l ien to Lake $350 for the general cred i tors. Meanwhi le, B is nei ther helped nor harmed 
by the voidable preference action. 
" There is an impediment to such a use of § 506(d). Because the t rustee's theory depends en­
ti rel y on preservation of the avoided lien for the benefit of the estate, close aueniion must be paid to 
the text of the l ien-presenoing statute: 
Any transfer avoided under section 522 , 544, 545, 547 , 548, 549, or 724(a) of this Litle, or 
any l ien void under stction 506(d) of this title, is preserved for the benefi t  of the estate but 
only with rtsptct to property of the estate. 
1 1  U .S .C .  § 55 1 ( 1 982) (emphasis added) .  This Section of the Code specifica l ly  contemplates the 
preservation of l iens avoided by § 506(d) , but the ital icized words are troublesome. The italicized
words might mean that a l ien can be preserved only so long as t he  debtor's equity is s t i l l  part of the 
estate (Taken l i tera l ly, the words can be read as total ly nonconsequential . I f  an avoided lien is pre­
served, the l ien i tsel f  is property of the estate , so that the l ien is always preserved with resptct to
property of the estate. On th i s  view, the i talicized words are meaningless. But because Congress is 
presumed not Lo speak meaningless and empty words, such an interpretation is, regrettably , too 
simple . ) 
Reference to the Supreme Court opin ion in wh ich lien preservation was first discussed wi l l  clar­
i fy what the italicized words of § 5 5 1  migh t  mean. In First National  Bank v .  Staake, 202 U.S. 1 4 1  
( 1 905 ) ,  a judgment creditor obtained a l ien that would eventuall y become a voidable preference. 
Thereafter, the debtor sold the equity in the properly to a third party .  Later, the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy .  Id. at 1 42-43 .  The Supreme Court al lowed the trustee to avoid the judicial l ien as a 
voidable preference, preserve it for the benefit of the estate, and then assert the avoided judicial lien 
against the third party's land. Id. at 1 44-49. I f  Staalre is sti l l  good law, the trustee can avoid the 
underwater portion of the lien under § 506(d), abandon the land to the debtor or to the surviving 
secured cred i tors , and then assert the avoided l ien against the equi t y that the bankruptcy court has 
undervalued . 
A later court, however, has read the above italicized words in § 55 1 as overru l ing the exact 
holding of Staake. In re Ward, 42 Bankr. 946 (Bankr. M .D .  Tenn. 1 984). That is, if the bankrupt 
estate no longer owns the equ i ty at the time of bankruptcy , no avoidable l ien can be preserved against 
t he col lateral .  This view is fatal to the trustee strategy I have just described i n  the text . 
For better or worse, the view expressed in Ward-no l ien preservation unless the estate owns the 
equity behind the preserved l ien-is consistent with the words but nol with the spirit of § 55  I .  The 
legislative history indicates that the i ta l icized words of § 5 5 1  were designed 10 prevent the trustee from 
asserting voided Lax liens against post-petit ion property acqu i red by the debtor. 1 24 CONG. REC. 
H32 ,350 (daily ed . Sept. 28, 1 978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). The ital icized language makes dear 
that the trustee may not avoid the l ien and then preserve i t  against the debtor's post-peti tion property. 
The legislative h i swry, t hen , supports Lhe view that Lhe italicized language applies only when the 
property encumbered by an avoided l ien is post-peti tion property . I t  has no appl ication to property 
which the debtor cannot exempt but which the estate abandoned . On this view , the trustee can use § 
506(d) lO obtain a lien on underva lued property outside of bankruptcy and can arbitrage between 
bankruptcy valuations and market values of col lateral .  
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the debtor equity and enforce the preserved lien against the bankrupt es­
tate's own equity interest. Therefore, if this theory holds up, arbitraging 
by the trustee can occur by moving directly from Section 506(a) to a Sec­
tion 363(f)(3) sale free and clear of liens, or by taking a detour through 
Section 506(d) avoidance. The difference between a straight arbitrage be­
tween Sections 506(a) and 363(f)(3), on the one hand, and the addition of 
Section 506(d), on the other, is purely formal. Without Section 506(d), the 
trustee receives the surplus by virtue of owning· the equity. Thanks to 
Section 506(d), there is no valuable equity, but the trustee owns the junior 
lien which must get the surplus over $450, the amount needed to pay off 
the valid secured claims of A and B. This possibility helps to prove that 
Section 506(a) valuations might well be final judgments after all. 
C. The Creditor's Right to Bid In
Let us back track a bit and suppose that our preferred reading of the
Code is true. That is, Section 363(f)(3) is read to prevent a sale unless the 
high bid exceeds the face amount of the secured claims. In addition, Sec­
tion 506(a) valuations do not constitute a ceiling on undersecured creditor 
claims. Now the trustee cannot arbitrage between the valuation hearing 
and the actual sale.66 That is, the Section 506(a) valuation is not an abso­
lute ceiling on undersecured creditor entitlements under Chapter 7. 
Rather, Section 506(a) valuations have significance for voting and the like 
pending a 363(f)(3) sale, but not for the purpose of measuring the entitle­
ment to the cash proceeds of a 363(f)(3) sale. Instead, the secured parties 
have a lien on cash proceeds for the face amount of their claims against 
the debtor. Using the numbers of our example, A and B each have a lien 
for $350 on the cash, and the trustee may not sell unless the high bid is at 
.. The author of the Cardozo Note, supra note 29, at 1254, assumes that il is enough that the 
trustee is unable to sell collateral unless the sales price exceeds the face amount of the secured credi­
tors' claims. However, this alone would not stop the arbitrage the author fears. Suppose, using our 
example, that A and 8 have claims of 1350, and that the collateral is worth only SSOO lo its highest 
valuing user. Under this author's view, the sale cannot occur as administered by the trustee. The 
collateral must be abandoned to A and B. At state law, the§ 506(a) limitations would not apply, so A 
and 8 would be fully protected, as the author hopes. But now suppose the trustee finds a buyer 
willing to pay 5750. Under the author's view, the trustee may now hold the sale, but the question still 
remains as to the entitlement to the cash proceeds. Unless one takes a relaxed view of the § 506(a) 
valuation (assumed to be $450), the trustee might be able to pay A 1350, B SIOO, and expropriate the 
rest. The trustee here has successfully arbitraged between the § 506(a) hearing and the actual auction. 
Therefore, full protection from such arbitrage requires a relaxed view of the § 506(a) limitation on 
the undersecured creditor's secured claim. 
Incidentally, the author of the Cardozo Note assumes elsewhere that the "relaxed imerpretation" 
of§ 506(a) valuations is correct. Cardozo Note, supra note 29, at 1261-62. 
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least $700.57 
Traditional maxims of legislative interpretation pose some problems 
with this view. For example, one is not suppose to read a section of the 
Code in a way that deprives another provision of all use and utility.u The 
above reading of Section 506(a) might transgress this rule. In Section 
363(k), undersecured creditors are provided with a protection that would 
not be important unless Section 506(a) provides an otherwise immutable 
ceiling. 59 Section 363(k) provides: 
At a sale ... of property that is subject to a lien that secures an allowed 
claim, unless the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim 
may bid at such sale, and, if the holder of such claim purchases such prop­
erty, such holder may offset such claim against the purchase price of such 
property.•0
Reverting back to our hypothetical in which B has a claim for $350 but 
only $100 of which is thought to be secured, Section 363(k) ought to im­
ply that, at the sale held by the trustee, B must pay in some cash-enough 
to make sure that A's senior claim is covered. After that, B is free to bid in 
her $100 secured claim and her S250 unsecured claim. As a result, B bids 
$501 and wins the auction (at which, we have stipulated, the high bidder 
01 Still, it cannot be true that § 506(a) poses no sort of ceiling at all. The following example will 
reveal why. Suppose D would like 10 file a Chapter I 1 plan in which A (the senior fully secured 
creditor) receives payments on principal. If B (the junior undersccured creditor) has a right 10 
whatever collateral is available 10 her at state law-i.e., § 506(a) never limits B's claim-then every 
dollar paid to A increases B's collateral entitlement. Some provision must be kept to allow D 10 pay A
for the advantage of D's general creditors. Pitre v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n of Chicago 
(In re Pitre), 11 Bankr. 777, 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. I 981 ); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 'II 506.04 at
506-19 (15th ed. 1985); UCLA Note, supra note 2, at 1962. Cf In re Rosage, 82 Bankr. 389, 390
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (suggesting that equitable subordination of the second mortgagee might be 
appropriate, at least where the first mortgagee was an insider).
There is a conceptually adequate way to achieve this result. In bankruptcy, where A and B both 
claim liens on property, and when A's lien is voidable by the trustee for some reason, the voidable lien 
never just disappears. If it did, then B is the direct beneficiary of the trustee's avoiding power. Instead, 
the voided lien is preserved for the bankrupt estate, so that the trustee takes over A's priority against 
B. 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1982). Similarly, when the trustee chooses 10 pay A, A's lien should not be taken
as disappearing. That would only benefit B. Instead, we should think of the trustee as buying an
assignment of the lien, so that A's priority is preserved for the estate . 
.. For a celebration of such reasoning, see United Savings Ass'n. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Assocs., Ltd.,_ U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 626, 632 (1988). 
00 In rt Terrace Gardens Park Partnership, 96 Bankr. 707, 713 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) 
(reading § 363([)(3) to allow a sale for less than the face amount of secured claims and connecting § 
363(k) to abuse of § 363([)(3)).
00 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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would have paid $500 for the collateral). The $501 price, however, can be 
paid in the form of $350 cash (which goes to A), $100 in the form of the 
allowed secured claim, and $51 in the amount of the allowed unsecured 
claim (which had been $250). Note that the $250 unsecured claim is 
"funny money." In a bankruptcy in which general creditors are expected 
to get five cents on the dollar, the $51 portion of the claim that B is 
allowed to bid in is really worth $2.51, but thanks to Section 363(k), the 
claim is counted as if it were worth $51.61 
Before we show how Section 363(k) implies a "strict ceiling" view of 
Section 506(a), it is necessary to digress a little about the way Section 
363(k) is written. The above paragraph sets forth a preferred interpreta­
tion of Section 363(k). It was assumed that B can not bid in her claims 
until A has been paid in cash. But nothing in Section 363(k) requires B to 
pay cash to A before the bid-in occurs.62 Nevertheless, such a cash re­
quirement must be implicit in Section 363(k), as the following example 
illustrates. 
Pursuant to the literal terms of Section 363(k), suppose B is allowed 
to bid in the claim, without paying in enough cash to pay off A. In such a 
case, B may pay in the $ 100 secured claim first and the $250 unsecured 
claim second. At this point, B has exhausted her claims, so that, to reach 
the high bid of $501, B must add $151 in cash. A, who has a senior claim 
to any proceeds from the sale, does not get a cash recovery for the full 
amount of her $350 claim. Instead, A gets $151 in cash, a secured claim 
against the collateral for $100 (remember, the sale was free and clear of 
all liens, so A may be getting only a worthless paradox here), and an 
unsecured claim worth far less than the face value of $100. This is no full 
recovery for A! It would have been better if Section 363(k) clearly stated 
that B gets to bid in her claims only after all sales expense and all senior 
secured claims are settled in cash. Only thereafter should B obtain the 
protection of bidding in unsecured claims worth a fraction of face value. 
Under· this view, B would have to pay $350 in cash, $250 in secured 
claim, and $51 in relatively valueless unsecured claim. 
" Some readers may be tempted to think that such a transformation of unsecured debt into 
valuable property rights is impermissibly preferential, privileging undersecured parties over general 
creditors. This is not a concern. Recall that we are addressing a gap between the appraised value and 
the true value of collateral. The gain enjoyed by the undersecured party represents a restoration to her 
of the value mistakenly denied her earlier. In other words, the gain constitutes no more than the 
correction of a valuation mistake. 
19 In one case, a junior creditor was permitted to bid in without providing any details about 
paying off the senior creditors. In re Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc., 81 Bankr. 682, 685 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
Presumably, the junior secured party paid enough cash to pay off the senior secured parties. 
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We have just suggested that, under Section 363(k), B may bid in her 
secured and unsecured claims. There is yet another interpretation of Sec­
tion 363(k) that, if adopted, might also imply strict ceilings in Section 
506(a). This third interpretation of Section 363(k) is based on the fact 
that Section 363(k) allows B to bid in only her allowed secured claim.63
Back to our example, suppose, at a Section 506(a) hearing, the bank­
ruptcy judge values the collateral at $450. The court has fully allowed A's
secured claim at $350 and has divided B's claim into a secured and un­
secured portion (of $100 and $250 respectively). That is, B is a non-re­
course claimant with an allowed secured claim of $100 and an unsecured 
creditor for the balance. Now Section 363(k) implies that B may only bid 
in her "allowed secured claim" of $100. If so, to win the auction, B must 
bid in the $100 (which has a fair market value of $100) and must pay 
$401 in cash. Under this interpretation of Section 363(k), B is not permit­
ted to bid in the valueless unsecured portion of her claim. Meanwhile, 
Section 506(a) valuations are assumed to be final. 
Such a reading would mean that Section 363(k) bid-ins could not 
protect secured parties from bad valuations plus a free and clear sale 
under Section 363(f)(3). At first glance, this observation might be taken to 
prove that B can bid in her secured and unsecured claim. But remember 
that Section 363(f)(3) was assigned its pernicious anti-creditor meaning in 
order to render Section 363(k) bid-ins a useful protection. If Section 
363(k) is not a useful protection, then perhaps we are free to adopt a non­
pernicious meaning of Section 363(f)(3), where the trustee may never sell 
collateral unless she can obtain a price guaranteed to reimburse the se-
•• Reviewing once again the conrusing text or § 363(k), that section says: "At a sale ... or 
property that is subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, ... the holder or such claim ... may 
offset such claim against the purchase price of such property." 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (I 982 & Supp. IV 
1986). "Such claim" refers to the allowed secured claim, under this reading. After a § 506(a) valua­
tion, an undersecured party has IUJo claims-only one of which is secured. But see Geico Fin. Servs., 
Inc. v. Cordes (In re Cordes), 37 Bankr. 582, 584 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) ("The language in §
363(k) refers to a lien secured by an allowed claim, not a lien secured by an allowed secured claim."). 
This remark from Cordes overlooks the fact that after a § 506(a) valuation, part of the claim is now
completely unsecured. Cf In re Harris, 94 Bankr. 832, 835-36 (D.N.J. 1989) (using this last obser­
vation to establish that § 506(a) can avoid the unsecured portion of mortgages on residences in spite of 
§ t 322(b)(2)). 
The requirement that a bidder have an "allowed secured claim" has led some litigants to insist
that secured parties whose liens have not yet been judicially declared valid should not be allowed to 
bid in. Two courts have allowed bid-ins upon a showing that the bidder could reimburse the estate ir 
the lien is later found to be void. In re Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc., 81 Bankr. 682, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 
1988); Bank of Nova Scotia v. St. Croix Hotel Corp. (In re St. Croix Hotel Corp.), 44 Bankr. 277 
(D.V.I. I 984). 
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cured party in full. 
There is some legislative history, however, indicating quite clearly 
that B can bid in both her secured and unsecured claim: 
[Section 363(k)] indicates that a secured creditor may bid in the full amount 
of the creditor's allowed claim, including the secured portion and any un­
secured portion thereof in the event the creditor is undersecured, with re­
spect to property that is subject to a lien that secures the allowed claim of 
the sale of the property.8• 
It seems clear enough from this part of the legislative history that Section 
363(k) was meant to allow undersecured creditors to bid in the unsecured 
portion of their claims.66 But there is some contrary legislative history as 
well: 
Throughout the bill, references to secured claims are only to the claim de­
termined to be secured under [Section 506(a)], and not to the full amount 
of the creditor's claim. This provision abolishes the use of the terms "se­
cured creditor" and "unsecured creditor" and substitutes in their places the 
terms "secured claim" and "unsecured claim."88 
Using this piece of legislative history on Section 363(k), it appears that 
the undersecured creditor can bid in only the secured portion of her claim. 
She may not bid the portion that is deemed by Section 506(a) to be fully 
unsecured. Therefore, it appears that the legislative history is inconclusive 
on the meaning of Section 363(k). 
Under the view that the secured party can bid in only her fully valu­
able allowed secured claim, Section 363(k) ends up implying nothing 
about whether Section 506(a) is a strict ceiling against which a trustee can 
arbitrage. But under the view that Section 363(k) obviously allows the use 
.. 124 CoNG. REC. H 32,396 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); see also S. 
REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CooE CONG. & AoMtN. NEWS 5787, 
5841; In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 75 Bankr. 580, 588 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987); Cardozo 
Note, supra note 29, at 1271. 
.. One court has stated its belief that non-recourse lenders have the right to bid the underwater 
portions of their claims. In re Realty Investments, Ltd. V, 72 Bankr. 143, 146 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1987). Most commentators ignore the point that after an undersecured claim is bifurcated under § 
506(a), § 363(k) allows the undersecured creditor to bid in only her allowed secured claim. They 
assume without question that both the secured and unsecured portions of the debt can be bid in. 5 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 111111.02(2) (15th ed. 1985). 
"" S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, rtprinted in 1978 U.S. CooE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5787, 5841 (emphasis added). 
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of unsecured claims as scrip in a trustee auction, Section 363(k) protects 
any junior secured creditor who is willing to take control of the collateral. 
This protective device implies a particular view of Section 506(a) valua­
tions. That is, a junior undersecured creditor requires protection under 
Section 363(k) only if Section 506(a) constitutes a strict and unvariable 
ceiling on her secured claim, and only if Section 363(£)(3) permits sales 
free of liens for amounts less than the total face amounts of the secured 
claims. Reverting again to the numbers of our hypothetical problem, if the 
trustee can only sell free of liens when the trustee obtains a bid of $700, 
then B never needs to bid in pursuant to Section 363(k), because the $700 
minimum price guarantees either that B will be fully paid, or that the 
trustee will abandon the property so that the sale can be conducted under 
the auspices of state law. Therefore, the existence of the protection in 
Section 363(k) implies that Section 506(a) does create strict ceilings 
against which the secured party needs prottction, and also that sal�s free 
and clear of liens can occur when the high bid is below the total claims of 
the secured parties claiming the collateral. 
But having said this, there is still one further problem with this view 
that Section 506(a) valuations must be hard and fast ceilings because oth­
erwise Section 363(k) has no purpose. Note that Section 363(k) does not 
limit bid-ins to sales free and clear of liens under Section 363(£)(3). It is 
possible that Section 363(k) applies in sales subject to outstanding liens. If 
this is right, Section 363(k) can have a purpose without Section 506(a) 
constituting a hard and fast ceiling on a sec�red party's entitlements.67 It 
turns out, however, that such an extension. of Section, 363(k) produces im­
possible results and that Sectiop 363(k) cannot apply to sales subject to 
outstanding liens. The following . exampk will show why this must be 
. ' .  ' • .. .... .. . true. . . , ., : .,_ ·</, 
Suppose the trustee does not wish to seit under. Section 363(£)(3 ). 
The trustee simply proposes to sell:the debtor',s'. equ�ty in collateral to X, 
fully subject to the liens of A arid .-B.J'(Jh� 'sale ·goes· through, X would be 
subject to the rights of foreclosure' ttta(l,1. ��-d-B' have under state law. 
Under state law, either A or B may enforce their (non-recourse)68 claims 
97 Recall that, in our example, if § 506(a) is \i�t a'l-strict .- eeiling,' �h;n the trustee can sell the 
collateral only if she receives a bid higher than $700. 8�_-if-,this is .the case, then the § 363(k) bid-in 
can never take place. What I am now suggesting is that"evenjf th� trustee must receive a bid of $700 
to hold a free and clear sale, § 363(k) still has a purpose because it can apply to sales subject.to (not 
free and clear of) I iens. 
18 The claim must be non-recourse, because X. is 'not l{abk_ o·n the· loan agreements between D, A
and B. See supra note 10. 
· · 
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against X's property. But suppose that, in bankruptcy, B may bid against 
X pursuant to Section 363(k). That is, while X bids cash, B bids her 
bankruptcy claims by way of setoff. Nothing in Section 363(k) expressly 
prevents B from doing this. If this is right, B need not even bid in the cash 
to pay off A, because A's lien against the property survives against the 
collateral being sold. B may bid in just enough of her secured claim to 
outbid X. Suppose, for example, that the collateral was worth $800 to X, 
so that X was willing to pay $100 for D's equity. This $100 would not go 
to A or B, but to the bankrupt estate.611 To win this auction, B must out­
bid X's maximum bid of $100. That is, B must bid $100.01 of her allowed 
secured claim. On this bid, B buys the equity in the collateral, which 
merges with B's security interest, so that B owns collateral encumbered by 
A's lien, in exchange for which B surrendered her junior lien ($100.01 by 
bidding and the rest through the doctrine of merger). Thus, B has a great 
competitive advantage over X. X must bid as if A and B will have surviv­
ing liens, whereas B may bid on the assumption that only A will have a 
surviving lien. If all of this were true, it would mean that Section 363(k) 
has a purpose beyond protecting B from sales free and clear of liens under 
Section 363(f)(3). That extra purpose is not to protect B at all but to 
enrich B in cases where the trustee wants to sell collateral subject to out­
standing liens. If that is so, Section 363(k) can not imply a strict and 
unchangeable view of the Section 506(a) ceiling. What this really means is 
that Section 363(k) has yet another unstated assumption-it applies only 
to sales free and clear of liens under Section 363(£)(3). Section 363(k) 
should be a shield and not a sword. There is no compelling reason I can 
think of to enrich B when the trustee wishes to sell the debtor's equity. 
Instead, Section 363(k) should be read as allowing bid-ins only when the 
trustee proposes to sell free and clear of liens under Section 363(£)(3).70 If 
.. Even this sensible conclusion is suspect. Under Article 9 of the U.C.C., the SlOO is proceeds 
on which both A and B have claims. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987). Thus, A retains a lien against the 
collateral and obtains a senior right to any cash obtained in a foreclosure sale sponsored by a junior 
party. This two-for-one opportunity is a drafting mistake in Article 9. Cash proceeds from foreclosure 
sales should not be proceeds for the purpose of§ 9-306(1). Set Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of 
Liens on A.fur-Acquired Property, 6 CARDOZO L .. REV. 505, 510 & n.29 (1985). But nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code overrides this unfortunate effect of Article 9. If this is correct, then the trustee will 
have a great deal of difficulty ever selling the debtor's equity in collateral subject to outstanding liens 
( when the underwater junior lien is covered by Article 9). 
•• In 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1988), one of the options for overcoming the objections of a 
secured party to a Chapter 11 plan (i.e., the cram down} is to hold a sale free and clear of liens and 
subject to a bid-in opportunity in § 363(k). This section does not prove that bid-ins are lin.ked logi­
cally to a free and clear sale, but it does show that the drafters associated the two ideas together (at 
least in this one instance}. The association may suggest that a logical or necessary connection also 
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so, and if you also think that an undersecured party may bid in the un­
secured portion of her claim, then it must be true that Section 363(k) 
implies that the trustee must have an arbitrage opportunity under Section 
363(f)(3 ), which in turn implies a strict view of the Section 506(a) ceiling. 
Section 363(k), then, contains numerous hidden assumptions. Fortu­
nately, the section also clearly states that a court may, for cause, alter the 
rules set forth in Section 363(k). Any one of the above bad results could 
easily be avoided if the court uses this invitation to temper Section 363(k) 
as literally written. If this is done, Section 363(k) can give effective relief 
against strict ceilings on entitlements imposed on an undersecured creditor 
under Section 506(a). 
As we shall soon see, the Section 1111 (b) election is itself another 
kind of relief from Section 506(a) ceilings. This time, however, the relief 
does not presuppose the existence of a Section 506(a) ceiling under Chap­
ter 7. It only presupposes that without the election, the Section 506(a) 
ceiling freezes into place in a Chapter 11 plan. Prior to the plan, the 
ceiling might be ignored without affront or insult to the Section 1111 (b) 
election. The election therefore can be viewed as relief from a Section 
506(a) ceiling in a Chapter 11 plan. It need not imply a strict ceiling in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation. Let us stipulate that Section 506(a) valuations are 
final at least in Chapter 11 ,71 except for the protections to be found in 
Section 363(k) and, as we shall see, in Section 1111 (b). This will allow us 
to look at how well the election works in conjunction with Section 363(k) 
bids to relieve undersecured creditors of the oppressive Section 506(a) 
ceiling. 
We will need yet another short digression first. One of the substan­
tive changes made by Chapter 11 turns non-recourse lenders into recourse 
lenders. The election must be understood against the background of this 
entitlement. 
II. THE SECTION 111 l(b) ELECTION
A. Non-recourse Lenders Under Section 111 l(b)
Apart from the Section 111 l(b) election, the section has a rule which
1s important for non-recourse undersecured creditors. Section 
111 l(b)(l)(A) provides: 
exists. 
" Georgia Dev. Authority v. Home (In rt Home), 99 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) 
(secured party could not have plan modified just because the collateral was more valuable than ex­
pmed at a § 506(a) valuation hearing). 
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A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed or 
disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the holder of such 
claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or 
not such holder has such recourse .... 71 
Now suppose a non-recourse lender advances $1 million on collateral 
worth $100,000. In the Chapter 11 plan, the non-recourse lender gets her 
secured claim for $100,000 and a bonus as well-an unsecured claim for 
$900,000. This provision is subject to two important exceptions. 
First, if the Chapter 11 plan provides that the collateral is to be sold, 
the undersecured creditor is stuck with no recourse.73 This disappointment 
is tempered by Section 363(k) which, if read carefully, permits the non­
recourse lender to bid in the submarine portion of her claim when the 
trustee sells the collateral.74 This relationship between Sections 363(k) 
and 1111 (b) permits us to see the two sections as mutually exclusive pro­
tections for undersecured creditors. In fact, one court has held that unless
the creditors are permitted to bid in, creditors without recourse under 
state law should get their recourse in bankruptcy, even if the plan calls for 
a sale of the collateral.711 In the same vein, courts have held that non-
u 11 U.S.C. § 111 l(b)(l)(A) (1982). 
" The plan mus1 spuify when the sale is to occur. Vague indications of some future sale are not 
enough to deprive non-recourse lenders of their recourse or of their right 10 make the election. In rt 
Georgetown Park Apartments, Lid., 103 Bankr. 248, 249-50 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989); In rt Western 
Real Estate Fund, Inc., 75 Bankr. 580, 589 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987) . .. 
The ability of the non-recourse lender 10 purchase its collateral al a sale, with a credit 
offset allowed for any bid up to the full amount of its deb!, insures 1ha1 1he lender is 
pro1ec1ed. If the property is being sold for less than 1he outstanding indebtedness and 1he 
lender feels this price is too low or ii feels future appreciation will be meaningful, ii may 
bid the full amount of its debt al the sale and take title to the property. With this protec­
tion, 1he non-recourse secured lender does not need and therefore is not given the sta1u1ory 
protection of § 111 l(b). 
In rt DRW Property Co., 57 Bankr. 987,992 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986). 
'"In rt Woodridge North Apts., Ltd., 71 Bankr. 189, 191 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). Ste also 
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. California Hancock, Inc. (/n rt California Hancock, Inc.), 88 
Bankr. 226, 229-30 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988). In California Hancock, a debtor-in-possession proposed a 
Chapter 11 plan in which 1he equity in the collateral (worth nothing, because the collateral was 
substantially overencumbered) would be sold to an insider for a certificate promising the deb!or-in­
possession a share of the profi1s. The sale would not foreclose the undersecured party's security inter­
est on the colla1eral. 
The courl refused 10 affirm the plan, because "the plan did not allow the appellec: 1hc: right 10 
credit bid." California Hancoclr., 88 Bankr. at 228. In addition, the court also ruled 1ha1 1he sale was 
nm a sale, bu1 a joint venture. Without an outright sale, 1he plan wrongfully denied the undersecured 
party its recourse under § 1111 (b)(I )(A). Id.
Undoubtedly, this sale was fishy. The equity may have been worth nothing, bu1 the receipt of 
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recourse lenders get no recourse if the plan calls for the abandonment of 
the collateral to �he secured creditor.78 If property is abandoned, then
there will be foreclosure at state law, where bid-ins are allowed.77 
Second, the non-recourse lender obtains no recourse if the non-re­
course lender is part of a class that elects application of Section 
1111 (6)(2). We still have not said what this election is about. For now, 
we can at least note that the creation of recourse for non-recourse lenders 
constitutes a bribe for classes of creditors who vote "no" in the election. 78 
Why did Congress import such a strange metamorphosis of non-re­
course debt into Chapter 11? One possible answer is that the Section 
1111(6) remedy was written to gratify some real estate interests offended 
by In re Pine Gate Associates.79 In Pine Gate, some non-recourse under­
secured creditors were purchase money lenders financing the construction 
of some condominia. In the middle of construction, the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy and successfully limited the secured claims of the construction 
lenders by the old equivalent of a Section 506(a) valuation hearing. Be­
cause the non-recourse secured lenders had a Section 506(a) ceiling placed 
on their claims, any gain in collateral value would go to general creditors 
half the profits was no price at all. If there had been no sale, the debtor-in-possession would have 
retained all the profits. It gained nothing by losing the collateral and half the profits. Therefore, the 
court did well to deny that a sale had occurred. 
•• Tampa Bay Assocs., Ltd. v. DRW Worthington, Ltd. (In re Tampa Bay Assoc., Ltd.), 864
F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1989); In re DRW Property Co., 57 Bankr. 987,992 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
77 H a sale is subject to liens or free and clear of liens, the non-recourse lender should get no 
recourse because both give the non-recourse lender a bid-in opportunity. We have said 1hat § 363(k) 
applies only 10 free and clear sales. It does not apply w sales subject to surviving liens. Nevertheless, if 
a sale subject to liens has occurred, the undersecured party may foreclose against the non-rernurse 
buyer, and the bid-in right can be applied. 
You may be wondering, "Can't the debtor forestall foreclosure by paying off the secured party 
and thereby preventing an enforcemenl sale? If so, 1hen no bid-in exis1s." Under Arlicle 9 of the 
U.C.C., this is impossible. Property can be redeemed only if the buyer pays "all obligations secured
by the collateral. ... "U.C.C. § 9-506 (1987). This implies 1ha1 an undersecurcd party mu l be paid 
in full, in which case the bid-in right is not needed. But this view is subject LO yet another
complication. 
Remember thal § 506(d) aulomalically limils a secured party lCl the amount of the § 506(a) 
ceiling, so long as a secured claim is filed in the bankruptcy case. See supra Lexi a companying notes 
33-42. Therefore, "all obligations secured by the collateral" (U.C.C. § 9-506) ma)' mean the § 506(a) 
ceiling and not more. If so, lhe bid-in is ddealed after all, because the collateral can be redeemed for
the amount of the § 506(a) ceiling.
•• 11 U.S.C. § I I l l(b)(l)(A)(i) (1982). 
71 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976); see General Electric Mortgage
Corp. v. South Village Inc. (In rt South Village, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 987, 999 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) 
("Section 111 I (b) was designed Lo overrule In rt Pinc Gate Associates.''). 
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and even to shareholders.80 None of the gain could go to the non-recourse 
lenders. Therefore, one possible explanation for the recourse/non-recourse 
distinction in Section 1111 (b) is that the drafters of the language, told to 
placate real estate lobbyists, took their task literally. They protected non­
recourse lenders because non-recourse lenders were the ones who had 
been damaged in Pine Gate.81 
B. Recourse Lenders Under Section 111 J(b)
If Chapter 11 changes non-electing, non-recourse debt into recourse
debt (where no sale of the collateral is planned), the obverse is not neces­
sarily true, as courts and commentators routinely assume;82 that is, elect­
ing recourse lenders are not deprived of their recourse. This belief comes 
from the language of Section 1111 (b)( 1 )(A) which, once again, provides: 
00 Pint Catt, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 1487-91. Under old Chapter XII, the shareholders 
might bcnifit by a valuation freeze because Chapter XII did nm follow the "absolute priority rule for 
dissenting creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 472(5) (1976) (repealed 1978). Su In rt Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 3
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 301, 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1977) (Norton, J.).
Ironically, the same judge who condoned a freeze-out of secured creditors in a Chapter XII plan 
also waxed indignant at the idea that a secured creditor should be frozen at liquidation value at the 
begining of a bankruptcy proceeding. Instead, fairness required that the valuation take place at or 
near confirmation and at a higher going concern value. Furthermore, aher valuing the property based 
on present value of future income, Judge Norton kicked up the valuation of the condos by twemy 
percent, just in case appreciation value might accrue. Id. at 308. Therefore, if secured creditors were 
enraged by Pine Gate, they overlooked some mitigating generosity from Judge Norton in his later 
opinion. 
11 The transmutation of recourse debt into non-recourse debt works an extraordinary effect on 
buyers of collateral under Article 9. Article 9 invites a debtor to sell her equity in collateral to a 
buyer. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1987). Sometimes the sale itself destroys the security interest, as when the 
collateral is inventory. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) ( 1987). It is possible, however, that a buyer takes the 
collateral subject to a perfected security interest. In such a case, Article 9 is careful to treat the buyer 
as if he were a non-recourse debtor. U.C.C. § 9-112 (1987); su also U.C.C. § 9-105(1){d) (1987) 
("Where the debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the same person, the term debtor means 
the owner of the collateral. . . "). 
Should the buyer file a petition under Chapter 11, the buyer's creditors will be surprised to learn 
that the lender of funds 10 some third party (who sold collateral to the buyer) now has a deficit claim 
against the buyer's bankruptcy estate, an extraordinary result. For example, suppose A has a 
11,000,000 claim against a debtor's personal property, worth only $100,000. The debtor sells this 
property out of the ordinary course of business to X for SI .00. X then files for Chapter 11 reorganiza­
tion. In X's reorganization proceedings, A now has a recourse claim of 1900,000 in addition to the 
secured claim of SI 00,000 . 
.. In rt Western Prekrred Corp., 58 Bankr. 201,210 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); In re Union 
Square Assoc. Ltd., 53 Bankr. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985); In re Southern Mo. Towing Serv., Inc., 
35 Bankr. 313, 314 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In rt Griffiths, 27 Bankr. 873, 876 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
I 983); Provident Bank v. BBT (In rt BBT), 11 Bankr. 224, 231 n.12, 237 n.20 (Bankr. D. Nev. 
1981); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 111111.02[51 (15th ed. 1985); Eisenberg, Tht Undersutmd 
Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 VAND. L. REV. 931, 965 (1985). 
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A [secured] claim ... shall be allowed or disallowed ... the same as if the 
holder of such claim had recourse against the debtor . . . whether or not 
such holder has recourse, unless-
(i) the class of which such claim is a part elects ... application of
[Section 111 l(b)(2)) .... 83 
The typical implication drawn from the language of Section 
111 l(b)(l)(A)(i) is that the election negates recourse, but it is also possi­
ble to read this language as providing that the election negates only the 
opening clause of Section 111 l(b)(l)(A). Once the opening clause is ne­
gated, then the basic rule of Section 502(b) applies. That is, those who 
have recourse as part of their non-bankruptcy rights continue to have it. 
Those who were non-recourse lenders lose the bonus that the first clause 
gives them; if non-recourse lenders make the election, they remain non­
recourse lenders. 
One commentator, Isaac Pachulski, finds in Section 1129(a)(7)(B) 
proof that recourse lenders forefeit their recourse when they make the 
Section 1111 (b)(2) election. To assess this claim, it would be useful to set 
forth the entire text of Section 1129(a)(7), which provides that a Chapter 
11 plan can be confirmed only if: 
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class­
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will recieve or retain under the plan on account of such claim or
interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is
not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
or
(B) if section 1111(b)(2) of this title applies to the claims of such class, each
holder of a claim of such class will receive or retain under the plan on
account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the
plan, that is not less than the vlaue of such holder's interest in the estate's
interest in the property that secures such claims.84 
This, of course, is the famous "best interest of the creditors" test. 
In accounting for the presence of Section 1129(a)(7)(B), Pachulski 
claims that it proves the notion that electing recourse lenders forfeit their 
recourse. According to this theory, Section 1129(a)(7)(B) cancels an effect 
•• 11 U.S.C. § l I I l(b)( l)(A) (I 982). 
" 11 U.S.C. § l 129(a)(7) (1988). 
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that Section 1129(a)(7)(A) would otherwise have. Section 1129(a)(7)(A) 
requires that every creditor must receive at least as much from a Chapter 
11 plan as she would have received in a liquidation. Section 1129(a)(7)(B) 
forecloses the possibility of the following argument by an electing secured 
party: (t) in Chapter 7, the secured party would have a recourse claim; 
(2) in Chapter 11, the plan that denies her recourse (pursuant to Pachul­
ski's interpretation of the election) might give her less than she would
have in Chapter 7 liquidation; (3) therefore, the plan cannot be
confirmed.811 
If Pachulski's premise is correct, his point is clever. But if you believe 
that electing recourse lenders should keep their recourse, Section 
1129(a)(7)(B) has a different purpose-simply to negate the idea that an 
electing secured creditor is entitled to receive t 00 percent of her claim. 86 
Notice that Pachulski assumes that Section 1129(a)(7)(A) does not apply 
to the unsecured deficit claims of electing undersecured creditors. Why 
does this follow? According to Section 506(a), an undersecured claim is to 
be divided into two separate claims. The election applies only to the se­
cured portion. The unsecured deficit (of a recourse creditor) is not subject 
to the election. Therefore, it is possible to read Section 1129(a)(7)(B ), not 
as an alternative, but as a supplement, to Section 1129(a)(7)(A). It does 
not necessarily prove that electing recourse lenders forfeit their recourse. 
The legislative history is divided on this difficult point. Some of it 
refers only to the fact that an electing non-recourse lender loses the re­
course that Section 111 l(b)(t)(A) would otherwise supply. It does not 
hint that electing recourse lenders lose their recourse.87 On the other 
hand, here is Congressman Don Edward's statement: 
One last point deserves explanation with respect to the admittedly complex 
subject of confirmation. Section 1129(a)(7)(C) [now Section 1129(a)(7)(B)] 
in effect exempts secured creditors making an election under 1111 (b)(2) 
from application of the best interest of creditors test ... [U]nder Section 
1111 (b)(2), the creditors are given an allowed secured claim to the full ex­
tent the claim is allowed and have no unsecured _ deficit. Since Section
00 Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Ban/cruptcy Code, 58 
N.C.L. REV. 925, 935 (1980). 
" That is, in my view § 1111 (b)(2) implies that the § 506(a) ceiling is cancelled, and § 
l 129(a)(7)(B) emphasizes that the electing creditor is entitled to no more than the value of the collat­
eral in the Chapter 11 plan. Meanwhile, if the electing creditor is entitled to an unsecured deficit 
claim, this separate unsecured claim is still covered by § 1129(a)(7)(A). 
" 124 CONG. REC. H32,350 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONC. 
REC. H28,257 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (statement or Rep. Edwards). 
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1129(b)(2)(A) makes clear that an electing claim need receive payment of a 
present value only equal to the value of the collateral, it is conceivable that 
under such a "cram down" the electing creditors would receive nothing 
with respect to their deficit. The advantage to the electing creditors is that 
they have a lien securing the full amount of the allowed claim so that if the 
value of the collateral increases after the case is closed, the deferred pay­
ments will be secured claims. Thus it is both reasonable and necessary to 
exempt such electing class from application of Section 1129(a)(7) as a logi­
cal consequence of permitting election under Section 111 l(b)(2).88 
Here Congressman Edwards does state the view that recourse creditors 
forfeit their recourse if they elect. For this reason, only the part of the 
cram down statute that applies to secured creditors need be met. There is 
no need to meet Section 1129(b)(2)(B), which pertains to cram down of 
unsecured creditors. Hence, at least this part of the legislative history sup­
ports Pachulski's theory of Section 1111 (b). 
With this background knowledge about non-recourse and recourse 
undersecured creditors under Chapter 11, we can proceed to an analysis 
of who may elect under Section 1111 (b) and what the election means. 
C. Eligibility to Elect Under Section 11 ll(b)
The Section t 111 (b) election protects undersecured creditors from the
limits of Section 506(a) valuations imposed in a Chapter 11 plan. Section 
111 l(b) is an alternative to Section 363(k) which, if read creatively, pro­
tects undersecured creditors, who can bid in the portions of their claims 
that appeared to be unrecoverable as a result of a low Section 506(a) valu­
ation. Curiously, voter registration for the Section 1111 (b) election is lim­
ited to the following types of undersecured creditors: (a) undersecured 
creditors (recourse or non-recourse) if the Chapter 11 plan does not call 
for sale of the collateral,89 or (b) where a sale is planned, any non-re­
course undersecured creditor.90 Each of these classes is further purged 
whenever, in a Section 506(a) valuation, the secured portion of the under­
secured creditor's claim has an "inconsequential value. "91 The Section 
._ 124 CoNG. REC. H32,408 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (emphasis 
added). 
•• This follows by negative implication of 1 l U.S.C. § I 1 l 1(b)(t)(B)(ii) (1982), which provides
that the election is not available if "the holder of a claim of such class has recourse against the debtor 
on account of such claim and such property is sold under Section 363 of this title or is to be sold under 
the plan." 
00 Id. (also by negative implication). 
" "A class of claims may not elect ... if-(i) the interest on account of such claims of the 
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1111 (p) election, then, is not for wishful-thinking creditors who are com­
pletely underwater with respect to their liens.92 
Do these restrictions on electoral eligibility make sense? Regrettably, 
no. There is no good reason to give non-recourse lenders an election when 
collateral is to be sold, if Section 363(k) is read correctly. Eliminating the 
election in all cases when the collateral is to be sold83 would have made 
some sense, because those creditors can beat the limitations in Section 
506(a) by bidding in their claims under 363(k).9" Under this view, Sec­
tions 363(k) and 1111 (b) could have been characterized as mutually ex­
clusive alternative relief from strict Section 506(a) ceilings. Unfortunately, 
such a vision of symmetrical order and coherence is denied to us. If a sale 
is held, only recourse lenders are barred from the election. Non-recourse 
lenders may still go ahead with the election. 
This distinction between recourse and non-recourse lenders is not 
comprehensible. One might be tempted to say that when a sale is planned, 
Section 363(k) does not help non-recourse lenders, so that the election in 
such cases is still necessary. Yet Section 363(k), if it defeats Section 506(a) 
ceilings at all, should do so for both recourse and non-recourse lenders. 
Therefore, availability of Section 363(k) protection cannot justify the re­
course/non-recourse distinction.90 Because the distinction cannot be justi­
fied, one court has stated summarily that if the Chapter 11 plan includes 
a sale, non-recourse undersecured creditors may not elect. 86 One author 
concurs that no election is ever allowed if the collateral is to be sold. The 
basis of this argument is the following legislative history: 
Sale of property under Section 363 or under the plan is excluded from 
holders of such claims in such property is of inconsequential value .... " 11 U.S.C. § 111 l(b}(l)(B) 
(1982). 
11 Nevertheless, even if non-recourse creditors who are completdy underwater may not elect, 
they may still enjoy the transmutation of their non-recourse claims into recourse claims. In re Atlanta 
West VI, 91 Bankr. 620, 623 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). 
ta Of course, § 1111 (b) does not do this. It only eliminates the election for recourse lenders. In 
case of a sale, the non-recourse lender may still elect. 
.. This was the rationale articulated in congressional debates. 124 CONG. REC. H32,407 (daily 
ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 5 Cot.LIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 11 I 1.02(3} at 1111-
22-24 (15th ed. 1985). 
"' Recall that under one of the views of § 363(k), undersecured creditors can bid in only their 
"allowed secured claims." Under this interpretation, the § I 1 I I (b) election becomes necessary to pro­
tect non-recourse lenders in case of a sale. But recourse lenders would be in the same position under 
such an interpretation of § 363(k), and they would need protection under § I I 1 I (b) just as much. 
Therefore, nothing can be induced about the meaning of § 363(k) from the recourse/non-recourse 
distinction in § 1111 (b)() )(A)(ii). 
" In rt Realty Investments, Ltd. V, 72 Bankr. 143, 145 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (in dicta). 
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treatment under Section 1111 (b) because of the secured party's right to bid 
in the full amount of his allowed claim at any sale of the collateral under 
Section 363(k) .... rn
The argument is that the broad reference to Section 1111 (b) (and not to 
its subparts) shows congressional intent that the election is never available 
when the property is to be sold. Under this reasoning, if a sale is planned, 
non-recourse lenders cannot elect,98 and the Section 111 l(b) election looks 
more clearly like an alternative to Section 363(k) bid-in protection for 
Chapter 11 cases which contemplate no sale of any collateral.99 This ar­
gument, though rational, does not jive very well with Section 
111 l(b)(t)(B), which provides: 
A class of claims may not elect application of [Section 1111 (b)(2)) if ... (ii) 
the holder has recourse against the debtor ... and such property is sold 
under Section 363 of this title or is to be sold under the plan.100 
This language clearly indicates that non-recourse creditors may have their 
election, whether or not the property is to be sold. 
In any case, if a reorganization contemplates no sale-rather it con­
templates an ongoing business with the use of collateral in the busi­
ness-no creditor can beat the Section 506(a) ceiling by use of Section 
363(k), which depends on a sale for the setoff power to be exercised. 
Therefore, in such cases, both recourse and non-recourse creditors are en­
titled to the election. 
Finally, we have said that the Section 1111 (b) election may not be 
made by any creditor who comes up with an "inconsequential" secured 
claim in the Section 506(a) valuation. In our example, where A and B 
07 124 CONG. REC. H32,407 (daily ed. September 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 
CoNG. REC. S17,420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
•• This argument is developed in Stein, Section 111 l(b): Providing Undersecured Creditors
with Postconfirmation Appreciation in the Value of the Collateral, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 210-12 
(1982). 
" If no election is allowed (for recourse lenders} when a sale of the collateral is planned, it 
should likewise follow that no election should be allowed when the trustee elects to abandon the 
collateral. After abandonment, undersecured creditors would enjoy under state law similar protection 
to that supplied by § 363(k) of the Code. At least one court, however, has ruled to the contrary. In
fact, it ruled that electing creditors could prevent the trustee from abandoning altogether! In re Grif­
fiths, 27 Bankr. 873 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). Because this view is dependent upon the court's interpre­
tation of the substance of the § 1111 (b) election itself, analysis of this position is deferred until the
nature of the election has been laid out. See infra text accompanying notes 110-137.
1
•• 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (b)(l )(B)(ii) (I 982).
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have $350 claims and where the collateral is valued at $450, B would 
have a "consequential" secured claim and hence would be entitled to a 
Section 1111 (b) election, if she is otherwise qualified. But suppose a third 
mortgagee, C, exists with a $350 claim. The court in a Section 506(a) 
hearing would award C a $350 unsecured claim and a zero secured claim. 
Such a person would be excluded from the election. 101
This does not appear to be fair. The type of evil in Pine Gate might 
well involve the existence of a C who is completely underwater. The ceil­
ing in Section 506(a) hurts C even more than it hurts B, yet C is denied 
the protection of the Section 1111 (b) election. Fortunately, C is entitled to 
the protection in Section 363(k), so that, if a sale free and clear of liens is 
contemplated, C does not need the election. Therefore, if C is in a position 
to bid in her claim, C is prejudiced only in the case where no sale is 
contemplated. 
D. What the Election Does
To summarize the immensely complicated discussion in the preceding
pages, if the collateral is not to be sold, the Section 1111 (b) election is 
available to any secured creditor who is not completely under water. If a 
sale is contemplated, only non-recourse secured lenders may elect. We 
have not yet said what they may elect. It is about time we did so, to the 
extent this can be done. 102
••• See In re Rosage, 82 Bankr. 389 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (where lien was completely under­
water, undersecured creditor could not elect); In re Wandler, 77 Bankr. 728 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (a
secured/unsecured split of 4%/96% made secured claim "inconsequential," barring secured party
from election); In re Baxley, 72 Bankr. I 95, I 98-99 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986) (A secured/unsecured split 
of 8%/92% was "consequential," and the election was allowed). If we may take the borderline to be 
between 4% and 8%, it should be remrn1bered that accruing interest of senior secured parties will tend 
to lower the percentage that the junior secured parties are secured, thereby rendering the value or the 
secured claim ''inconsequential." In rt Baxley, 72 Bankr. al I 97-98 (allowing senior interest and 
collection fees to arcrue in spite of the election). However, adequate protection should preserve the 
original spli1. Set also In re Ccmury Glove, Inc., 74 Bankr. 958, 962 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987) (Chapter 
11 plan may nm destroy election rights by manipulating the ratio between the secured and unsecured 
claim). 
••• As to wh'1n they mu ·t elect, Bankruptry Rule 3014 provides that it may be done "at any time 
prior to the condusion of the heJring on the disclosure statement or within such later time as the 
court may fix." Frn. R. BANKR. P. 3014. See In re Rosage, 82 Bankr. 389 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); 
see also In re Century Glove, Inc., 74 Bankr. 958, 961 (Bankr. D. Del. l 987) ("a secured creditor 
class must know the prospects of its treatment under the plan before it can intelligently determine its 
rights under § 1111 (b)"). 
This timing rule is a tricky matter. As indicated by Rule 3014, drafters of the Chapter 11 plan 
will have difficulty coping with the electoral powers of the secured party, because the disclosure hear­
ing already presupposes that the Chapter 11 plan has been drafted. Su 11 U.S.C. § I 125 (1982 & 
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Suppose A is a non-recourse lender of $1,000,000 to the debtor. The
collateral is worth $100,000. There are no other liens on the collateral but 
A's. A therefore faces a Section 506(a) ceiling of $100,000. A sale of the 
collateral free and clear of liens is planned. If A makes the election in 
Section 1111(b)(2), A knows that, "notwithstanding Section 506(a)," she 
will have a secured claim "to the extent that such claim is allowed."103 
The Section 1111 (b) election presupposes that we know to what extent 
A's claim is allowed. 
It turns out that the definitional machinery of the Code has a pecu­
liar gap. If the non-recourse lender files a claim in a Chapter 11 proceed­
ing, then Section 111 l(b)(l)(A) applies to determine the "extent" to 
which the non-recourse lender has an allowed claim. 10• According to Sec­
tion 111 l(b)(t)(A): 
A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed or 
disallowed under [S)ection 502 of this title the same as if the holder of such 
claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or 
not such holder has such recourse. . . .108 
Applying this language to our example, it now appears that A has an 
Supp. Ill 1985). Before Rule 3014 was drafted in 1983, one court suggested that "alternate plans 
should be filed" whenever a secured party with election powers is involved. Provident Bank v. BBT 
(In re BBT), 11 Bankr. 224, 237 n.20 (Bankr. D. Nev. I 98 I); set In Tt Executive House Assocs., 99 
Bankr. 266, 280 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (alternative plans proposed). However, the BBT court's 
suggestion offers no resolution. As a trio of recent commentators have suggested, "lilf there are just 
five separately classified secured claims that could elect, there arc twenty-five possible combinations of 
elections. Debtors have enough dirficulty filing a single plan, let alone twenty-five plans .... " Pu­
sateri, Swartz & Shaiken, Section 111 J(b) of tlu Banlcro.ptcy Code: How Much Dots The Debtor 
Have to Pay and When Should the Creditor Ettct, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 130 n.7 (1984). These 
authors assume that coordination between electing secured parties and debtors-in-possession will occur 
informally. Id. at 142 & n.78 ("The key to [Clhapter 11 is communication outside the courtroom ... 
. "). Accord In rt Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 83 Bankr. 52, 55-56 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988) 
(well informed creditor could not rely on failure of debtor-in-possession to sci election deadline and 
could not elect af1er plan was confirmed). Another commentator suggests that the undersecured credi­
tor file a written request for both a copy of the disclosure statement and notice of the hearing on the 
statement. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017{a). This combination would produce "a copy of the plan several 
weeks prior to the expiration of the deadline for making the§ I I I l(b) election." LoPucKI, STRATE· 
GIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS, 492-93 (1985}. 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (6)(2} (1982). 
'
04 11 U.S.C. § 1111(6}(2) (1982} ("If such an election is made, then notwithstanding Section 
506(a) of this title, such a claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim is allowed.") (empha­
sis added}. 
••• 11 U.S.C. § llll(b}(l)(A) (1982). 
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allowable claim of $1,000,000, not just the $100,000 awarded in the Sec­
tion 506(a) valuation. Only $100,000 of this is secured; the rest is an 
unsecured claim for $900,000. But this extension of the allowable claim is 
subject to a remarkable self-contradictory exception. According to Section 
11 ll(b)(l)(A)(i), A does not enjoy this expansion of her claim from non­
recourse to recourse if: 
the class of which such claim is a part elects, by at least two-thirds in 
amount and more than half in number of allowed claims of such class, ap­
plication of paragraph (2). of this subsection. 106 
Let us make it easy and assume A is a one-person class, as is usually 
the case for secured creditors under Chapter 11. 107 If A, a non-recourse 
lender under non-bankruptcy law, elects, A loses her right to recourse. 
Furthermore, the election means that A is entitled to be treated as secured 
to the extent of her allowed claim. Recall that her claim must be allowed 
on a non-recourse basis, meaning that it is limited to the value of the 
collateral. This seems to defeat A utterly and lead to the implication that 
A is entitled to the same $100,000 that A received in the Section 506(a) 
valuation. Under this view, the election is meaningless. A escapes the Sec­
tion 506(a) ceiling only under the provisions of Section 363(k) and not 
through any help that the election can give. A is better off not electing and 
instead obtaining recourse for the balance of $900,000. 108 
, .. Id. 
1•1 See In re Hallum, 29 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding that single-class lend­
ers can make the election). For secured parties who prefer a recourse unsecured claim in lieu of 
whatever the election gives them, a single-member class for the unsecured claim has been ruled inap­
propriate. In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 Bankr. 421, 426-27 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. I 988). The Meadow 
Glen court thought that such single member classes dilute the power of non-recourse lenders to influ­
ence the class of unsecured creditors to which they would otherwise belong. Id. This would be so in 
one circumstance in particular. Section 1 I 29(a)(10) requires at least one impaired class of creditors to 
vote yes on the plan. Ir the recourse claim is added to the class of general creditors, perhaps it could 
prevent that class from voting yes. Ir no other class has voted yes, then the recourse creditor can block 
confirmation of the plan. If § 1 I 29(a)( I 0) is clearly met regardless of classification, a good argument 
can be made that a non-recourse lender's unsecured deficit claim is more powerful in its own class 
than it is in a class with other unsecured creditors. Within its own class, the non-recourse lender can 
guarantee for itself that the class will vote no and thereby obtain the protection of the absolute priority 
rule in cram down. See 11 U.S.C. § I 129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (I 988). 
For a case allowing the recourse claim to be classified separately from trade creditors ( who were 
prepared to vote for the plan and thereby satisfy § I 129(a)(I0)), see In re Greystone III Joint Ven­
ture, 102 Bankr. 560, 568-72 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). 
, .. This point is not limited to non-recourse lenders, because most authorities believe that even 
recourse lenders lose their recourse if they make their election. I have argued that recourse lenders do 
not lose their recourse. See supra text accompanying notes 72-87. 
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This interpretation obviously reads the Section 1111 (b) election right 
out of the Code (which, come to think of it, might not be a bad thing). 
However, for those who think each statutory word must have its purpose, 
we have at least demonstrated that, without a doubt, Section 111 l(b) can 
not be read too literally. Instead, creative interpretation is needed to give 
A some protection from the Section 506(a) ceiling through the Section 
1111(b) election. 
2. The Orthodox Interpretation of the Election
No writers have noticed the circular definition of allowable claims in
Section 1111 (b). Instead, they have skipped this analysis and jumped right 
to the assertion of some positive content in Section 1111 (b). Here is a 
common meaning attributed to the election: 
Upon making an 1111 (b) election a creditor ... has the right to receive the 
full amount of its allowed claim over time, as long as these payments have a 
present value as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of the 
creditor's interest in its collateral.109 
Under this formulation, the election requires that total cash payments 
over time to A must equal S1,000,000, but that the present value of those 
time payments need only equal $100,000. In other words, it is open for a 
debtor-in-possession to pay the St ,000,000 over any period of time, so 
long as the discounted value of the payments has a present value of 
$100,000. In this reading, the economic value of the election can always 
be defeated by debtors-in-possession who extend cash payments out long 
enough to equate present value of the income stream with present value of 
the collateral. What good is the election then? It still leaves the under­
secured creditor with the Section 506(a) ceiling, and the right to receive 
100 In re Wandler, 77 Bankr. 728, 732 (Bankr. D.N.D. I 987); su also In re Kvamme, 93
Bankr. 698, 699-700 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 1111.02[5) (15th ed. 
1989). Pusateri, Swartz & Shaiken, supra note 102, at 136; Stein, supra note 98, at 202. This view is 
solidly backed by some legislative history which gives the following example: 
For example, ir a creditor loaned SI 5 million to a debtor secured by real property worth 
118 million and the value or the real property had dropped to S 12 million by the date 
when the debtor commenced a proceeding under Chapter 11, the plan could be confirmed 
notwithstanding the dissent or the creditor as long as the lien remains on the collateral to 
secure a Sl 5 million debt, the face amount or present or extended payments to be made to 
the creditor under the plan is at least S 15 million, and the present value or the present or
deferred payments is not less than S12 million. 
124 CONG. REC. H32,407 (daily ed. September 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. 
REc. S17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement or Sen. DeConcini). 
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total compensation over time is completely unimportant. The rational se­
cured party looks at the value of what she gets now. The length of the 
payout is economically insignificant. 
There are two sorts of reasons asserted for making the Section 
1111 (b) election. First, it has been asserted that undersecured creditors 
affirmatively want long payouts because the long payout implies that the 
secured party cannot be cashed out immediately with a lump sum pay­
ment equal to the Section 506(a) ceiling. Second, it has been asserted that 
the benefits of the election are only felt upon default. Each of these ortho­
dox rationales will be explored in turn. 
a. Long Payouts
The first claim is that the election forces long payouts in lieu of lump 
sum cashouts. 11° For example, if an electing secured party claims 
$1,000,000 on $100,000 worth of collateral, the election requires either 
that the secured party get $1,000,000 of cash now, or $1,000,000 over 
many years. 111 The theory is that if the debtor-in-possession has rid itself 
of the undersecured creditor with cash, it could freely expropriate the in­
crease in collateral value for itself. Therefore, the long payout forces the 
debtor-in-possession to keep the electing undersecured creditor around. 112 
The motive behind this rationale is well-meaning, but it does not 
follow that a long payout is needed to reserve for an undersecured party 
any future appreciation in value of the collateral. There is no reason why 
the secured party could not be given immediate cash for the present value 
of the collateral, plus more cash later, if the collateral actually does appre­
ciate. In any case, because payment can be stretched out so that the pre­
sent value of the payments equals the present value of the collateral, long 
payouts make no great economic sense. 
This view that long payouts are affirmatively desirable led the court 
in In re Griffithsm to declare that a major meaning of the election is to 
11• In re Southern Mo. Towing Scrv., Inc., 35 Bankr. 313,314 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); Fort­
gang & Mayer, Valuation In Banlcniptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1115 (1985); Klee, All You Ever 
Wanttd to Know About Cram Down Under the New Banlcruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 113, 
161 (1979). 
111 See BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER·CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE § 13.02 
(1988). 
111 Thus, in In re Kvamme, 93 Ba.rµcr. 698, 699-700 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988), a plan was rejected 
by the court because the plan provided for only a fifteen year payout and hence did not generate 
enough dollars over time to equal the full amount of the secured claim. 
m 27 Bankr. 873, 876-77 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). 
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prevent the debtor-in-possession from abandoning property that the credi­
tor wants the debtor-in-possession to retain. Such an anti-abandonment 
policy also makes no sense. Because the electing creditors were under­
secured in Griffiths, a sale would not have benefited the general creditors. 
The debtor-in-possession could keep the property and invest in improve­
ments, but any increase would also go to the electing undersecured credi­
tor. Therefore, the debtor-in-possession is forced to deal with the property 
even when the general creditors would not benefit thereby. 114 
A later case, In re Elijah, 115 interprets Griffiths to mean that aban­
donment is prohibited only when the undersecured claim is not paid in 
full-that is, both the secured and unsecured portion. But when the se­
cured party is expected to be paid in full-that is, the creditor is over­
secured-then abandonment is permitted. This observation is both correct 
and trivial. If the secured party is oversecured, there is certainly no need 
to make the election. At a minimum, it must be true that abandonment is 
allowed in cases where the secured party enjoys an equity cushion. In 
Elijah's Chapter 11 plan, the undersecured creditor was to receive part of 
its collateral and cash for the balance, which, if the collateral were valued 
correctly, would satisfy 100 percent of the undersecured party's claim. 116 
For this reason, abandonment was allowed with the understanding that if 
the undersecured party received less than the estimated value of the collat­
eral under state law proceedings, the debtor-in-possession would make up 
the difference with cash. 117 
A better mode of reconciliation is available than the one proposed by 
the Elijah court. In Griffiths, the debtor-in-possession proposed to aban­
don part and retain part of the collateral. For the part retained, the 
debtor-in-possession proposed to cash out the secured party exactly like 
the secured party in Pine Gate. 116 Therefore, unless all collateral is aban­
doned, it should still be possible to make the election. Under the meaning 
of the election to be proposed in this article, the consequence of the elec­
tion would be to repeal the limits of the Section 506(a) valuation with 
regard to the part of the collateral retained. 111 
114 The Griffiths case is defended in Waas, Letting the Lende,- Have It: Satisfaction of Secured 
Claims by Abandoning a Portion of the Collate,-al, 62 AM. 8ANKR. L.J. 97, I 05-06 (1988). 
111 41 Bankr. 348, 351 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984). 
11• Id. 
"' Id. at 352. 
ua /n re Griffiths, 27 Bankr. 873, 876-77 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). Su In re Pine Gate Associ­
ates, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976); see also text accompanying notes 79-
81. 
m Thus, in Griffiths, the undersecured party's claim would be reduced by whatever the under-
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The availability of election in cases of total abandonment, however, 
seems questionable. It will be recalled that recourse lenders could not elect 
at all when the plan called for a sale. One of the reasons given for this 
ineligibility is that when the property was to be sold, the undersecured 
party could protect herself by bidding in under Section 363(k). In the case 
of abandonment, the lender will likewise have bid-in protection under 
state law. Therefore, it would be logical for lenders to have no election 
rights in abandonment cases. Yet the stated rationale of Griffiths, which 
does not even seem economically useful, does quite the opposite, in order 
to preserve an extended payout for undersecured creditors. 
b. Default
A second explanation as to why the election pays is described in In re 
Wandler130 and goes as follows: 
The real value of a Section 1111 (b) election is where the collateral appreci­
ates in value and the debtor defaults under the plan [citation omitted]. Then 
instead of having a secured claim based upon the value of the collateral at 
confirmation, with the remaining debt having received unsecured treatment 
and/or discharged, the creditor may foreclose on the collateral and recover 
up to the full amount of its claim. 111 
In other words, the election repeals the Section 506(a) ceiling in case of 
default. If the plan holds, the ceiling stays in effect and becomes the guide 
for how much present value the undersecured creditor should receive 
under the plan, but if the plan fails (as many do) the creditor who elects 
can capture cash proceeds from the collateral in excess of the Section 
506(a) ceiling. At least this part of the interpretation of Section 
1111 (b)(2) makes good sense. In my proposed alternative reading, it will 
still be true that, in case a plan falls apart, the secured party can pursue 
the collateral as if no Section 506(a) ceiling were in effect. 111 I will be 
secured party realized on the abandoned property. The reduced bankruptcy claim would then be 
made subject to the election with regard to the retained collateral. 
uo 77 Bankr. 728 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); stt also In rt Southern Mo. Towing Serv., Inc., 35 
Bankr. 313,314 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983). 
111 77 Bankr. at 732; In rt Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 309 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983); see also
LoPucKI, supra note 102, at 491. 
111 This view also has the support of the legislative history, if one reads carefully: 
If Section 111 I (b)(2) applies then the "electing" class is entitled to have the entire amount 
of debt ... secured by a lien even if the value of the collateral is less than the amount of 
the debt .... For example, if a creditor loaned $15,000,000 to a debtor secured by real 
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going further to suggest that the meaning of the election is to repeal the 
Section 506(a) ceiling in all respects. 
The author of a comprehensive theory of Section 1111 (b), Jeffrey 
Stein, agrees with the above theory of the election's utility, but he would 
add that the utility of the election comes not only when the plan collapses. 
It also occurs when the debtor-in-possession, while still meeting the plan, 
changes her mind and sells collateral that initially was not to be sold. If a 
sale occurs under either scenario-plan failure or plan continuance-the 
electing creditor is entitled to the proceeds "up to the full amount of the 
debt." 133 Therefore, Stein believes that, in case of sale but not other­
wise,m the Section 506(a) ceiling is repealed for the electing secured 
party. The election does not guarantee the electing secured party a full 
recovery on her claim. Stein equates the election as adding a "due on sale" 
clause to the security agreement between the electing secured party and 
the debtor-in-possession.1211 
The Collier treatise seems to take an even more extreme position. It 
goes beyond the view that the Section 506(a) ceiling is eliminated when 
the plan falls apart. Not only must the undersecured creditor get the full 
property worth Sl8,000,000 and the value of the real property had dropped to S12,000,000
by the date when the debtor commenced a proceeding under Chapter 11, the plan could be 
confirmed notwithstanding the dissent of the creditor as long as the lien remains on the 
collattral to secure a SI 5,000,000 debt. ...
124 CONG. REC. H32,407 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (emphasis added).
The first sentence sounds as if the undersccured creditor should get S 15,000,000 of old and new 
collateral, but the second sentence makes clear that it suffices if the undersccured creditor retains a 
lien on the collateral she originally had. The latter idea implies that if the plan collapses and the real 
estate is still only worth Sl2,000,000, the undersecured creditor gets only S12,000,000. Cf the view of 
the Collier treatise, according to which she would get a guaranteed S 15,000,000 if the plan collapses 
(but less if the plan survives). Stt infra text accompanying note 127. 
111 Stein, supra note 98, at 212. Stein also believes that the election may be made only in cases 
when no sale of the collateral is planned. Ste supra note 46. This view ignores the words of 
§ l I I l(b}(l)(B)(ii), which disqualifies only recourse lenders in case of sale, but Stein's theory docs
not necessarily depend on his assumption. Note that this view separates § 111 I (b) from the Pine Galt
case, beca4se Stein assumes the election cannot take place in case a sale is planned. In Pine Gate, a
sale was planned, so that no election could have taken place (in Stein's view) if§ 1111 (b) existed then.
,., The preferred view to be presented later will differ with regard to this condition. Ste infra 
text accompanying notes 139-151. 
, .. Stein, supra note 98, at 212. Stein goes too far in one respect. Stein claims that if the debtor­
in-possession docs not own the collateral and instead owns stock of a subsidiary that owns the collat­
eral, the cash proceeds of the stock ought to be given to the electing secured party. 
This seems wrong. The collateral is fully encumbered and then some. If the subsidiary has a 
positive value, it must come from assets other than the overencumbered collateral. Therefore, Stein 
would give wealth unconnected to the collateral to the electing secured party, who at best is entitled 
only 10 standard cash proceeds of the collateral itself. Stt U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987). 
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value of the collateral but additional collateral besides, until the under­
secured creditor is fully secured. The Collier treatise states the meaning of 
Section 1111 (b)(2) as follows: 
Thus, in the case of the holder of a claim in the allowed amount of 
$ 100 secured by a first lien on property of the estate with a value of $7 5 
... if section t t t t (b)(2) applies, the amount of the secured claim would be 
$100, the holder would be entitled to retain his lien to the extent of $100 
and receive deferred payments totalling at least $100 and which have a 
present value of at least $75, but the holder would have no unsecured 
claim. 121
Professor Theodore Eisenberg echoes this theme in his article on the 
Section 1111 (b) election: 
Considering a failed reorganization may illustrate more concretely section 
t t t t (b)'s effects on other creditors. Assume that our undersecured creditor 
with a debt of St00 and collateral of $75 elects to be treated as fully secured 
because the creditor expects the collateral to appreciate in value. The credi­
tor finds itself with a secured claim of $100, secured by a lien "to the extent 
of the allowed amount of such" claim. 117 
That is, even though the collateral is worth only $75, Eisenberg believes 
that the plan (soon to collapse) must give the secured party extra collat­
eral, so that the undersecured creditor has fully $100 in collateral alto­
gether. After collapse, the undersecured creditor is free to foreclose on the 
$75 collateral and the additional bonus collateral as well. 128 
The Collier view finds some support in Section 1129(b), which pro­
vides, inter alia, that, as to dissenting classes of creditors, the plan must 
be "fair and equitable."m Section 1129(b)(2)(A) defines "fair and equita-
m 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 506.04 at 506-23 (15th ed. 1984). 
117 Eisenberg, supra note 82, at 966 (footnote omitted); stt also Pachulski, The Cram Down and
Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Banliruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REV. 925, 933 (1980) ("For exam­
ple, a creditor with a recourse claim who is owed a debt of St00,000, the payment of which is secured 
by property worth S60,000 ... would have a secured claim for SI00,000 and no unsecured claim if 
the creditor made the § I I I I (b) election."). 
iu Immediately after the above quote, Eisenberg asks us to "la]ssume ... that the debtor's 
reorganization plan is confirmed but that the reorganization effort fails soon after confirmation, before 
any payments have been made, and after the collateral has appreciated in value to SIOO." Eisenberg, 
supra note 82, at 966. Therefore, it could be that Eisenberg would restrict the above rule only 10 cases 
in which collateral has appreciated beyond the full amount of the secured claim. If so, then Eisen­
berg's view does not differ from Stein's. 
,.. It U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988). 
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ble" to mean several alternative things, including the following: 
(i)(I) that the holders of [secured] claims retain the liens securing such 
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor 
or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such 
claims; ... 
(ii) for the sale, subject to Section 363(k) of this title, [citation omitted]
of any property that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and 
clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, 
and the treatment of such liens or proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this 
subparagraph; or 
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of
such claims. 180 
Each of these options is at least consistent with the view that a plan 
must fully collateralize an electing secured creditor's entire plan. The first 
strongly indicates as much. Recall that, according to Section 1111 (b)(2), 
electing creditors have "secured claim[s] to the extent that such claim is 
allowed."131 Read together with Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), these words
could imply the following: (1) the undersecured creditor in the Collier 
example is entitled to only $7 5 in present value under the Chapter 11 
plan, (2) total cash payments over time must eventually equal $100, and 
(3) in the meantime, the secured party must have a lien on $100 of assets
in case the plan fails. 1311 
The other two cram down ideas are not inconsistent with Collier's 
position either. The second option is that a plan can provide for a sale free 
and clear of liens, with the secured party getting the cash proceeds. 133 As 
we have seen, a sale in the plan eliminates the election, except for non­
recourse lenders. Hence, it is possible that a debtor-in-possession could 
rely on the second option to satisfy an electing non-recourse creditor's op­
position to a plan. The second option does not indicate how much collat­
eral must be sold to satisfy the "fair and equitable" standard. Therefore, 
if the meaning of the election is that the undersecured party must be given 
1
•• 11 U.S.C. § 1 l 29(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1988) (emphasis added).
131 11 U.S.C. § 111 l(b)(2) (1982). 
132 The statement of Congressman Don Edwards accords with this reading: "The advantage to 
the electing secured creditors is that they have a lien securing the full amount of the allowed claim, so 
that if the value of the collateral increases after the case is closed, the deferred payments will be 
secured claims." 124 CONG. Rte. H32,408 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards}; 
set supra text accompanying note 88. 
m 11 U.S.C. § l l 29(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
298 BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 6 
additional collateral worth the total amount of her claim, then the extra 
collateral must be sold as well to meet this idea-not just the the original 
collateral. 
Similarly, the third cram down idea is simply that the secured party 
be given the "indubitable equivalent" of her state law rights. But if the 
meaning of the election is now that the secured party should have more 
than her state law rights, "indubitable equivalent" cannot mean that the 
debtor-in- possession can simply ignore the election and give the secured 
creditor less than the collateral needed for the full amount of the secured 
creditor's claim. Rather, it must mean that more collateral must be sup­
plied pursuant to the Collier interpretation of the election. Thus, to sum­
marize, the first cram down option seems very consistent with the idea 
that the undersecured party's full claim must be collateralized in the plan, 
so that the undersecured party can have a full recovery in case the plan 
defaults. The second two cram down options are at least not inconsistent 
with such an interpretation of the election. 
Here is another thought in favor of the Collier view. Recall that most 
authorities assume that a recourse lender who elects under Section 
1111(b)(2) forfeits her recourse. 134 This would make complete sense if the 
Collier treatise were right-that the election means that the plan must 
completely collateralize an electing creditor's claim. In such a case, the 
creditor would be oversecured, and there would indeed be no unsecured 
deficit to assert against the debtor-in-possession. Thus, the Collier view is 
consistent with the view that I have presented in this article-that, in case 
of the election, the electing secured party does not forfeit recourse. Instead, 
the Collier editors simply believe that electing creditors are fully secured 
creditors who have no cause to make an unsecured claim in bankruptcy. 
In contrast, I have asserted that an unsecured deficit remains useful even 
after the election, because it is not necessary for a Chapter 11 plan to fully 
collateralize an electing creditor's claim. 
Although the Collier view of the Section 1111 (b) election can be 
forced into a reconciliation with the language of the cram down provision, 
it would pose a significant threat to the entire Chapter 11 idea. To see 
how, let us use the example in which a lender of $1,000,000 has collateral 
worth $100,000. 
If the Collier view is right, the plan from its inception must provide 
$1,000,000 in collateral for a claim with a present value of $100,000. It 
will not do to let the undersecured party have a lien on the $100,000 
184 See supra text accompanying text notes 82-88. 
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collateral at the inception of the plan and to acquire a "springing lien" on 
undefined extra collateral only on default. 186 For a plan to be confirmed, 
a debtor-in-possession would certainly have to show where this extra col­
lateral would come from and at least must promise to keep this collateral 
unencumbered. 
Now many debtors-in-possession will not have the extra collateral to 
meet this requirement. Even if they do, many debtors-in-possession will 
not be able to devise a plan in which other unsecured creditors get more 
from the plan than they would from liquidation (where $900,000 need not 
be given to the undersecured party).111 So read, the Section 111 l(b) elec­
tion becomes an enormous weapon by which radically undersecured par­
ties can force a company with going concern value into liquidation. This 
means that even in cases where collateral could not possibly appreciate in 
value ·(accounts receivable cases, for example), a radically undersecured 
party has a powerful incentive to gain a crushing power over the Chapter 
11 proceeding. And yet the Section 111 t(b) election seems clearly aimed 
at reserving collateral appreciation for undersecured parties. Something 
must be wrong if the election is still valuable even though collateral is not 
appreciating in value. 
Although not determinative, the legislative history connects the elec­
tion with appreciating value of the collateral: 
The advantage to the electing creditors is that if the plan is crammed down 
... , they have a lien securing the full amount of the allowed claim so that 
if the value of the collateral increases after the case is closed, the deferred 
payments will be secured claims. u7 
In this passage, the author of the legislative history assumes that the ad­
vantage of Section 111 l(b) is connected to an increase in value in the 
collateral. The Collier view (which requires collateralization of the entire 
claim of the undersecured party) is not so connected. Under such a view, 
the undersecured creditor gets a full recovery (when the plan collapses) 
whether or not the collateral has increased in value. 
To summarize, the orthodox interpretation of Section 1111 (b)(2) 
•n By "springing lien," I mean a lien that docs not exist at the outset or the plan but later 
"springs" into existence for the first time at default. Springing liens a� forbidden under 1 I U.S.C. § 
545(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), when a state government tries to create one. 
,,. Stt 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988). 
m 124 CONG. REC. Hll,105 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement or Rep. Edwards); 124 
CONG. REc. Sl7,422 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement or Sen. DeConcini) (emphasis added). 
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holds that the Chapter 11 plan must give the electing secured party the 
value of the Section 506(a) ceiling (with the payout period manipulated so 
that the electing secured party also gets eventual cash payments equivalent 
to the face amount of the secured party's claim). This interpretation is 
justified by the claim that (a) there is supposedly some intrinsic value in 
receiving payments over the long term rather than an equivalent lump 
sum cash payment today, or that (b) if the plan falls apart, or is modified 
(so that the collateral is sold), the undersecured creditor gets a bonus be­
yond the amount of her Chapter 11 entitlement. Within this latter view, 
there are three subtheories on what advantage a secured party might get 
by electing. The first "default" view (from In re Wandler) states that, in 
case the plan defaults, the secured party simply has rights against the 
collateral as if no Section 506(a) ceiling exists. The second "due on sale" 
view (Stein's) is that the secured party has rights against the collateral as 
if no Section 506(a) ceiling exists, whether or not default occurs, so long 
as the debtor-in-possession sells the collateral. The third "full collateral" 
view (from the Collier treatise) is that electing undersecured creditors get 
at least this, plus enough collateral to guarantee a 100% recovery on the 
face amount the secured party would like to receive. This third view is the 
most disastrous, and yet it is not inconsistent with the words of Section 
1129(b)(2)(A). 
E. A Counter-Reading of Section 111 l(b)
There are at least two impracticalities in the orthodox reading of
Section 1111 (b). First, the orthodox reading of Section 1111 (b) forces the 
debtor-in-possession into adopting extended payouts in order to minimize 
the wealth transferred from itself to creditors. This inflexibility may not 
be terribly important; defeasance procedures would allow a debtor-in-pos­
session to wipe such a long term obligation off its books later, if need 
be. 138 There is, however, at least one case holding that payout periods
cannot be extended past the periods which are customary for the type of 
loan involved,139 and another holds that payout periods may not exceed 
, .. "In subs1ancc dcfcasancc" refers to the prac1ice of matching issued debt with federal govern­
ment securities which have equal maturities and interest rates. Defeased debt permits the debtor's 
accountants to eliminate debt from the liabilities side of the books in exchange for eliminating 1he 
federal securities from the asset side. Su generally Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1095-96 (1985). 
,.. In re Foster, 79 Bankr. 906, 910-11 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); see also Lo PUCK I, supra note 
102, at 491 (1985). 
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the useful life of the collateral. ao These cases, if followed, would interfere
with the orthodox view of the Section 1111 (b) election. 
Second, the orthodox reading does not account for investments in the 
collateral. This is a serious defect. If the value of collateral increases, it 
will usually do so in response to debtor-in-possession investments in the 
collateral. Under the orthodox reading, the electing creditor is automati­
cally entitled to the value of the collateral, even if the debtor-in-possession 
has invested considerably in the collateral and thereby has made it more 
valuable. This interpretation of Section 1111 (b) is a powerful disincentive 
against debtor-in-possession investment (without some sort of subordina­
tion bargain between the electing creditor and the debtor-in-possession). 
Suppose, for example, that A has lent $1,000,000 in exchange for a 
mortgage on vacant land worth $100,000. The debtor-in-possession de­
cides to invest $800,000 in putting up the building. The building is even­
tually sold under the plan for $1,000,000. We ought to adopt a reading 
that allows the debtor-in-possession to charge the $800,000 investment 
against the entitlement of the undersecured creditor. Otherwise, the 
debtor-in-possession loses the investment and merely enriches the under­
secured creditor, or, more to the point, the debtor-in-possession refuses to 
make the investment. At a minimum, it ought to be the case that the 
amount invested can be charged to the collateral under Section 506(c). 141 
The proposed alternative reading is simple: the election means only 
that electing creditors are never subject to final Section 506(a) valuations. 
In the case of electing (recourse or non-recourse) creditors in Chapter 11 
plans contemplating no sale of the collateral, the electing undersecured 
creditors are entitled to a second look later on to make sure that no collat-
••• In rt White, 36 Bankr. 199 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). 
1•
1 Section 506(c) provides:
The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, 
necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of 
any benefit to the holder of such claim. 
Actually, even if the debtor-in-possession can recover the $800,000 investment under Section 
506(c), the debtor-in-possession will not make the investment, based on the numbers we are working 
with. What is the sense in investing unless the debtor-in-possession can gain a return on investment
that is better than any alternative investment? Only if the collateral can be improved so that it is 
worth more than Sl million will it provide a return to the debtor-in-possession. 
Privately negotiated solutions arc easily anained, however. The debtor-in-possession could offer 
to invest the S800,000 if the electing creditor would split the surplus with the debtor-in-possession. 
Such a possibility, viewed ex anlt, means that when the parties can bargain about the matter, no 
interpretation of Section I I 11 (b) matters much. But in cases in which the debtor-in-possession has 
already made the investment, it might be useful to have a ruling that allows for a charge against the
undersecured creditor of the Section 506(c) investment expense. 
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era! appreciation has occurred. 142 If so, then the electing creditors should
receive additional entitlements. This second look is not free from proce­
dural difficulties, 141 but fortunately, collateral that is used instead of sold 
rarely increases in value. Therefore, these problems will rarely be faced 
because few undersecured creditors will elect a second look when it is 
likely to go against them. 
In the more common case, where sales are contemplated, only non­
recourse lenders can elect.14" For these lenders, Section 1111(b)(2) should 
also be read to eliminate the Section 506(a) ceiling. Thus, when the collat­
eral is finally sold, they receive proceeds up to the amount of their claim 
(and no more). 1411 In the meantime, these creditors are entitled to keep
their liens on their collateral (or collateral of equivalent value). They are 
not entitled to additional collateral. 
Under the proposed interpretation of the Section 1111 (b) election, the 
debtor-in-possession is not required to pay the full face amount of the 
electing secured party's claim over time. Such an exercise is sterile. In­
stead, the plan need only give the electing secured party the Section 
506(�) ceiling. Any payout period that does the job will do. 
One of the benefits claimed for a required long payout period is that 
the secured party cannot be cashed out immediately. This supposedly pre­
vents the debtor-in-possession from ridding itself of the undersecured cred­
itor and thereafter expropriating the increased value of the collateral. The 
proposed interpretation of Section 1111 (b)(2) would allow for immediate 
cashouts, but the debtor-in-possession would not be able to deprive the 
undersecured creditor of increased collateral value. Even if the electing 
creditor receives cash, it will still be possible for that creditor to obtain a 
reassessment of the Section 506(a) ceiling at a later time. Receipt of im-
"
1 In contrast, Jeffrey Stein would suspend the § 506(a) ceiling only if a sale actually occurs. 
Su supra text accompanying notes 124-126. 
"' Once the Chapter 11 plan has gone into effect, the bankruptcy proceeding is ordinarily con­
sidered terminated; the automatic stay in bankruptcy la�s. and the relations between the under­
secured creditors and the debtor are now governed by the Chapter 11 plan. H the debtor-in-possession 
thereafter obtains increased value in the collateral, and if the undersecured party had a right to this 
increased value, there would have to be some procedure whereby the undersecured creditor's debt 
instruments are recalled and reissued, so that the new debt instruments equal the newly increased 
value or the collateral. This would require a bankruptcy court to retain jurisdiction over a Chapter 11 
plan, even after it is confirmed. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (implying the court 
may make exceptions to the usual post-confirmation rules). 
"' II U.S.C. § 11 l l(b)(l)(B)(ii) (1982) (by negative implication). 
"' Their claim, however, will be augmented by post-bankruptcy interest, because that is what 
oversecurcd creditors arc entitled to under § 506(b). Accord Provident Bank v. BBT (In rt BBT), I 1 
Bankr. 224, 231-32 n.12 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981). 
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mediate cash would not negate this right. 
The proposed reading of Section 1111 (b)(2) is consistent with the 
statutory language. To repeat once again, Section 1111 (b)(2) provides: 
If such an election is made, then notwithstanding Section 506(a) of this 
title, such claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim is 
allowed. 148 
Based on my reading, if "such claim" happens to be a non-recourse 
claim, it is only allowed up to the undersecured creditor's claim or the 
amount of the collateral, whichever is less. If "such claim" is a recourse 
claim (i.e., no sale is contemplated), the recourse would not be forfeited by 
an electing creditor. The underwater claim is still partly a secured claim 
and partly an unsecured one with the understanding that second looks 
will be permitted to redivide the total claim between its secured and un­
secured parts. An increase in the secured claim would portend a decrease 
in the unsecured claim. 
Meanwhile, if the debtor-in-possession invests $800,000 and thereby 
receives the value of the collateral up to $1,000,000, the debtor-in-posses­
sion may charge this investment against the collateral under Section 
506(c). In case of a sale under the plan, the electing (non-recourse) under­
secured creditor will be entitled to the $200,000 of sales proceeds because 
the $800,000 investment will be deducted from the proceeds. 
It is a fair question to ask what happens to the electing undersecured 
party when the value of the collateral goes down, contrary to expectations. 
If this occurs, the undersecured party takes the loss. That is, those who 
make the election assume the risk of upward or downward movements in 
value. Now it is true that secured parties are entitled to adequate protec­
tion against deteriorating collateral values, 147 but this is a right which
terminates when the Chapter 11 plan is confirmed. 148 Therefore, ade­
quate protection is no impediment to this view, and the fear of deprecia­
tion from any source would count as a powerful disincentive to make the 
election. 
u• 11 U.S.C. §1111(b)(2) {1982) . 
.. , 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) . 
.. , Set Carlson, Postpttition lnttrtst Entitlemtnts Undtr Tht Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI 
L. Rt:v. 577 (1989). Ironically, the term "adequate protection" comes from a post-confirmation stat­
ute under the old Bankruptcy Act, but today the term applies only to pre-confirmation proceedings. 
Id. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Valuations in bankruptcy are difficult enough at the level of price 
theory. This article has also pointed out the complex legal status of a 
bankruptcy valuation. Section 506(a) may stand for the proposition that 
strict ceilings can be placed on an undersecured creditor's allowed secured 
claim. Such a view is implied by the bid-in protection in Section 363(k) 
and by the lien avoidance provision in Section 506(d). Nevertheless, I 
have argued that both common sense and legislative history support the 
view that Section 506(a) valuations can be changed any time before a sale 
or a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed. Only valuations in Chapter 11 plans 
are strict limits. And for such ceilings, the Section 1111 (b) election stands 
as relief. 
The election in Section 1111 (b) is an extraordinarily difficult provi­
sion in the Code. It cannot be read too literally. At best, the Code can be 
read in a way that limits undersecured creditors to the value of the collat­
eral, after expenses for the preservation and improvement of the collateral 
are charged to the undersecured creditor's account. As such, the election 
becomes little more than a guard· against bad valuations of collateral 
under Section 506(a). The reading I have proposed is not flatly contra­
dicted by any words in the Code and avoids some unacceptable results of 
the current orthodox view of what the election means. 
Having dealt with the words of the Code, a little more might be said 
about what should happen to undersecured creditors in bankruptcy, if we 
could work from a clean statutory slate. 
There is a hidden property issue at stake in the debate over under­
secured creditors in bankruptcy: To what extent does the undersecured 
creditor own potential increased value of collateral, and to what extent 
should completely unsecured creditors own it, once a bankruptcy petition 
has been filed? A construction lender whose loan buys the materials and 
labor needed to increase the value of the collateral will certainly argue 
that, but for her loan, the increased value would not exist. On an analogy 
to purchase money superpriority, 149 the lender would claim ownership of
the increased value. On the other side, the general creditor will argue that 
her exposure to the risk of nonpayment also contributes to the debtor's 
financial existence, and that her unsecured risk is qualitatively the same 
as the undersecured creditor's risk. Equality of treatment argues that the 
increased value be shared pro rata. In addition, for the secured part of the 
"" UCLA Note, supra note 2, at 1963. 
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claim, an undersecured creditor is protected from any decrease in value. 
Why should such a creditor receive any improvement in value when she 
faces no risk of any decrease in value ?160 
This latter argument upholds against congressional judgment the 
wisdom of the Pine Gate decision, which implied that the increase in 
value must be shared by all who take an unsecured risk. Indeed, it is hard 
to distinguish the risks faced by an unsecured and an undersecured credi­
tor. One finds a strong policy favoring equal treatment of these risks in 
the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of after-acquired property liens. When a 
security agreement provides for the secured party to receive after-acquired 
property as collateral, Article 9 authorizes the enforcement of that 
clause. 1111 The Bankruptcy Code, in contrast, disencumbers all property 
acquired after the bankruptcy petition is filed. 1112 The distinction between 
after-acquired property and existing property that appreciates in value is 
not great for these purposes. 1113 Therefore, equality among creditors with­
out security demands that there be no election at all. 
If improvement in value belongs to the bankrupt estate in general, it 
probably follows that there be a strict ceiling established by Section 
506(a). If Section 506(a) is not a ceiling-if bankruptcy courts can amend 
1
00 Shanker, An lnttgrattd Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral: A Proposed Solu­
tion to the Fixturt Probltm Undtr § 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YALE L.J. 788, 791 
(1964) (making this argument in the context of fixture priorities). 
Ill U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1987). 
,.. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 552(b) goes on to save security interests 
in proceeds, offspring, and the like. 
One can find an "equality" policy in the voidable prererence Section as well. 11 U.S.C. § 
547{e)(3) (1982 & Supp. JV 1986) makes it clear that after-acquired property is deemed transferred 
to the secured party when the debtor actually acquires the property (and not before, as had been the 
case under earlier bankruptcy law). As a result, aher-acquired property transrerred from the debtor to 
the secured party within 90 days of bankruptcy is potentially a voidable preference. This denial of 
arter-acquired property Lo undersecured creditors is substantially tempered by § 547(c)(5), which 
saves from avoidance all security interests in inventory and receivables (to the extent that the secured 
party does not improve her position over the preference period). The technicalities or after-acquired 
property and voidable preference law could not be more complicated. For those who find this footnote 
opaque, an exhaustive account is provided in Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests as Voidablt 
Preferences (Pt. JI: The Floating Litn), 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1982); ste also Countryman, Tht 
Conctpt of a Voidablt Preftrtnct in Banll.ruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 790 (1985); Jackson, 
Avoiding Powm in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 768-77 (1984). 
,.. Stt In rt Tanner, 14 Bankr. 933, 936-37 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (equating post-bankruptcy 
increases of value with property acquired after the petition). This claim that the unsecured risk is the 
same for both classes of creditors not only applies to increased value arising from investment but also 
to straight fluctuations in commodity prices. If the collateral is gold bars and if gold appreciates in 
value after a bankruptcy, an undersecured creditor has still taken an unsecured risk that seems indis­
tinguishable from the risk other general creditors take on the same commodity. 
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the division between secured and unsecured portions of the underwater 
claim-then the increased value in the future (from investments) effec­
tively belongs to the secured party, because the secured party can always 
recapture increased value in the follow-up Section 506(a) valuations. We 
can see, therefore, that the ownership question determines the answer to 
whether we should have a "strict-ceiling" interpretation of Section 506(a). 
Even if the expectations of undersecured creditors are entitled to pri­
ority over general creditors' expectations, we still do not need the election, 
so long as we have a flexible interpretation of Section 506(a). The con­
stant availability of a "second look" prohibits the bankruptcy trustee from 
expropriating, for general creditors, the earnings opportunity that acceler­
ating value represents. 
Which view is better? I have no idea. There seems to be no great 
moral difference I can discern for favoring general creditors over under­
secured creditors. 1114 But here is a thought unconnected with theories of 
desert. One possible moral factor is that Section 506(a) valuations are fre­
quently "wrong."1511 A "second look" doctrine would protect against poor 
valuations, but it is hard to say who benefits and who loses from wrong 
valuations. It is often claimed that bankruptcy courts have a bias against 
undersecured creditors and for general creditors. If this were right, an 
entitlement in favor of undersecured creditors would eliminate more 
wrong valuations than would an entitlement for general creditors. Alter­
natively, if I were a believer in law-and-economics, I would try to find the 
welfare-maximizing solution (even though any solution I asserted would 
undo•J.btedly be empirically invalid). 1116 Nevertheless, I might timidly sug­
gest that limited liability of corporations exports major costs to potential 
and actual tort victims, that secured lending allows voluntary creditors to 
avoid the risk of limited liability, and that by awarding post-bankruptcy 
, .. I might favor tort creditors over voluntary creditors, but I see no difference between the risk 
that voluntary general creditors and undersecured creditors take in lending to a debtor. 
'" That is, the valuations in court do not match up with the value realized later in a sale. It is 
usually assumed that the judge, not the market, is wrong. 
, .. Cost-benelit analysis depends absolutely on discovering all the costs and benelits actually 
incurred. Law-and-economics practitioners can only do this by consulting all the people affected. If 
you posit a world. however, in which people arc not self-interested, this consultation can never end 
until you have consulted the whole world. Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MINN. L. REV. 207, 226-29 (1986). The dangers faced by 
law-and-economics practitioners were concisely described by the great Arthur Alan Leff: 
If a state of affairs is the product of n variables, and you have knowledge of or control over 
less than n variables, if you think you know what's going to happen when you vary "your" 
variables, you're a booby. 
Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 476 ( 1974). 
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value to the bankrupt estate, undersecured creditors would be forced to 
charge higher interest rates because of increased risk. This higher charge 
will chase more and more marginal producers out of the market, thereby 
reducing the amount of externalities imposed on the public. This assign­
ment of entitlements might serve to reduce the amount of uninsured 
hazards produced by American businesses. But such a claim can only be 
suggested most tentatively, because I have no data to support this claim. 167 
Although I have no moral intuition to offer about who should own 
post-bankruptcy increases in valuation, I hope that, at least, I have spelled 
out what the competing views of Section 506(a) entail. For those who 
think the general creditors should win, a strict Section 506(a) ceiling is 
essential. For those who think undersecured creditors should win, a con­
stantly shifting division between secured and unsecured claims under Sec­
tion 506(a) would be simpler and cleaner than the current Section 
1111 (b) election. 
107 Most real data show that lenders do not care at all about marginal changes in debtor-creditor 
law. E.g., Shuchman, Data on the Durrett Contr®ersy, 9 CARDOZO L. Rt:v. 605 (1987) (controver• 
sial anti-creditor fraudulent conveyance rule on foreclosure sales has no visible effect on the price of 
credit); Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Banlcruptc,: The Spherical Chiclctn, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 66, 76-83 (Autumn 1977). H so, law•and•cronomics engages in self-aggrandizing functionalist 
fallacies: that what lawyen do actually matters to human behavior. Clearly sometimes it docs. But 
law-and-economics forgets that sometimes it docs not. 
